Importing Political Polarization?
The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure*

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Abstract

Has rising import competition contributed to the polarization of U.S. politics? Analyzing multiple measures of political expression and results of congressional and presidential elections spanning the period 2000 through 2016, we find strong though not definitive evidence of an ideological realignment in trade-exposed local labor markets that commences prior to the divisive 2016 U.S. presidential election. Exploiting the exogenous component of rising import competition by China, we find that trade exposed electoral districts simultaneously exhibit growing ideological polarization in some domains—meaning expanding support for both strong-left and strong-right views—and pure rightward shifts in others. Specifically, trade-impacted commuting zones or districts saw an increasing market share for the FOX News channel (a rightward shift), stronger ideological polarization in campaign contributions (a polarized shift), and a relative rise in the likelihood of electing a Republican to Congress (a rightward shift). Trade-exposed counties with an initial majority white population became more likely to elect a GOP conservative, while trade-exposed counties with an initial majority-minority population become more likely to elect a liberal Democrat, where in both sets of counties, these gains came at the expense of moderate Democrats (a polarized shift). In presidential elections, counties with greater trade exposure shifted towards the Republican candidate (a rightward shift). These results broadly support an emerging political economy literature that connects adverse economic shocks to sharp ideological realignments that cleave along racial and ethnic lines and induce discrete shifts in political preferences and economic policy.

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1 Introduction

The ideological divide in American politics is at a historic high. Ranking congressional legislators on a liberal-conservative scale, based either on their roll-call votes (McCarty et al., 2016) or the political orientation of their campaign contributors (Bonica, 2013), reveals that the gap between Democrats and Republicans has been widening since the late 1970s.[1] A sizable rightward shift among the GOP and a modest leftward shift among Democrats has left few centrists in either party. The 21^{st} century has also seen greater polarization in the policy preferences and media viewing habits of the American public. In the 1990s and early 2000s, roughly half of respondents took moderate positions on prominent political issues; by the late 2000s the centrist share had shrunk to under 40%, as individuals adopted more strident views on the left or right (Pew Research Center, 2014a; Gentzkow, 2016). These trends are also reflected in, and amplified by, popular media (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Levendusky, 2013; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017).

This paper examines whether the exposure of local labor markets to increased foreign competition from China has contributed to rising political polarization in the U.S. since 2000. The appeal of studying the China shock is the abundant evidence linking foreign competition to a large and persistence decline in U.S. manufacturing jobs. Industries more exposed to trade with China have seen higher exit of plants (Bernard et al., 2006), larger contractions in employment (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2016), and lower incomes for affected workers (Autor et al., 2014; Galle et al., 2017; Caliendo et al., 2019; Autor et al., 2019). The local labor markets that are home to more-exposed industries have endured greater job loss and larger increases in unemployment, non-participation in the labor force, uptake of government transfers (Autor et al., 2013a, 2019), and declines in tax revenues and housing prices (Feler and Senses, 2015). The steepest increase in U.S. imports occurred just after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001; China's share of world manufacturing exports surged from 4.8% in 2000 to 15.1% in 2010. This export boom was driven by reform-induced productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing (Naughton, 2007; Brandt et al., 2017a), where China's reform push and the productivity gains associated with it appeared to have largely abated by the late 2000s (Brandt et al., 2017b).[2] The concentrated impact of the China shock on specific industries and regions makes the economic consequences of trade acutely recognizable and therefore politically salient (Margalit, 2011; Di Tella and Rodrik, 2019).

While U.S. political polarization did not originate with the China trade shock, the political

[1] In the 1990s and especially the 2000s, greater polarization is also evident in the content of political speech used by Democratic and Republican legislators (Gentzkow et al., 2019).

[2] Over 2000 to 2010, China's annual growth rate in manufacturing exports was 11.5 *p.p.* faster than the world as a whole; over 2010 to 2016, its growth advantage was just 2.8 *p.p.* Although China's manufacturing exports continued to grow after 2010, the transitional growth associated with China's post-Mao market-oriented reforms—on which we base our identification strategy—was largely exhausted by the end of that decade (Naughton, 2018; Lardy, 2019).

divisions have widened amid the recent expansion of trade. Moderate Democrats have become increasingly rare in Congress, while Tea Party and like-minded conservatives have risen to prominence in the GOP (Madestam et al., 2013). The surprise election of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency in 2016 has further heightened the partisan divide and injected ethnic nationalism into Republican policy positions. Among voters, ideological cleavages by race and education have also widened, as seen most notably in a realignment of less-educated whites with the GOP (Pew Research Center, 2017).[3] The causal linkages between economic shocks and sustained increases in partisanship remain poorly understood, however. Mian et al. (2014) find that while congressional voting patterns become more polarized following financial crises, these movements are temporary.[4] Although the widening ideological divide in Congress tracks rising U.S. income inequality (McCarty et al., 2016; Voorheis et al., 2016), the coincidence of these two phenomena does not reveal which underlying shocks intensify partisanship.[5] The concentrated and well-delineated economic geography of the China trade shock allows us to explore the linkages between economics shocks and political outcomes that are otherwise challenging to evaluate in a time-series or cross-country analysis.

In applying a local labor market lens to U.S. electoral politics, our analysis confronts two empirical challenges. One is that local labor markets, which we take to be Commuting Zones (CZs), do not map cleanly to congressional districts. Whereas CZs aggregate contiguous counties, gerrymandering often creates districts that span parts of several commuting zones. We resolve this issue by dividing the U.S. into county-by-congressional-district cells, attaching each cell to its corresponding CZ, and weighting each cell by its share of its district's voting-age population. To measure regional trade exposure, we use the change in industry import penetration from China, weighting each industry by its initial share of CZ employment. We isolate the component of growth in U.S. imports from China that is driven by export-supply growth in China, rather than U.S. product-demand shocks, following the identification strategy in Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016).

The discontinuous changes in voter composition and frequent turnover of incumbent representatives caused by the redrawing of U.S. congressional districts after each decennial census present a second empirical challenge. We surmount this issue by studying changes in the ideology of legislators first over the 2002 to 2010 period, during which most district boundaries are fixed and the mapping of districts to CZs is stable, and then over the 2002 to 2016 period, which requires us to account for

[3]For analysis of the rise of right-wing populism in high-income countries, see Inglehart and Norris (2016), Algan et al. (2017), Gidron and Hall (2017), Guiso et al. (2017), Dehdari (2018), and Dal Bo et al. (2019). For related work on populism, see Karakas and Mitra (2017), Rodrik (2017), and Pastor and Veronesi (2018).

[4]For related analysis of Europe, see Funke et al. (2016).

[5]The rise in political polarization appears causally unrelated to the structure of primary elections, rule changes in Congress, gerrymandering, or immigration (Gelman, 2009; McCarty et al., 2009; Barber et al., 2015; and McCarty et al., 2016). Other factors related to polarization include intensified media partisanship (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Levendusky, 2013; Prior, 2013) and stronger ideological sorting of voters by party (Levendusky, 2009). See Canen et al. (2018) on the contribution of the practices and structures of the major political parties to polarization.

redistricting-induced changes in the mapping of districts to CZs. When studying the extended 2002-2016 period, we exclude electoral outcomes across the intermediate 2010-2012 redistricting seam, except for the small number of districts that did not change boundaries.

We begin the analysis by evaluating how trade shocks affect political expression. We use TV ratings data from Nielsen Media to examine the news viewing habits of households, and we use the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME: Bonica, 2013, 2014, 2018) to examine the ideological leanings of campaign donors. Over 2004 to 2016, regions more exposed to import competition from China shifted consumption of TV news to the right-leaning FOX News Channel. Simultaneously, they increasingly drew campaign contributions from left-wing and right-wing donors but not from moderates. These patterns suggest that exposure to import shocks moved political sentiment away from the ideological center. A consistent finding woven among the many threads of evidence we examine is that the rightward shifts in ideological affiliation and voting patterns are more concentrated among or driven by non-Hispanic whites, with small, zero, or countervailing effects evident among Hispanics and non-whites.

We next examine the impact of exposure to trade shocks on the party and ideological composition of elected congressional legislators.[6] Although shocks increase campaign contributions from both liberal and conservative donors, across all districts the net beneficiaries in terms of electoral results are Republican candidates, and the most conservative candidates in particular. Districts exposed to larger increases in import competition became significantly more likely to elect a GOP legislator in each election from 2010 to 2016, while conservative rather than moderate Republicans absorbed these electoral gains. This occurs despite the fact that the net impact of the China shock on the Republican vote share in Congressional elections is small, and in some years even negative, as is the case in a county-level vote share analysis by Che et al. (2016). We find that the GOP was especially successful in increasing its vote share in competitive districts, while the Democratic party gained vote shares but not congressional seats in non-competitive districts.[7] Hence, although the ideological composition of political *donations* appears to polarize in trade-exposed districts, the net *electoral benefits* accrue to the GOP.

Motivated by the diverging political views of non-Hispanic whites relative to non-whites and Hispanics, documented in Pew polling data used by our analysis, we further explore whether these outcomes appear to differ systematically with the racial and ethnic composition of voting districts.

[6] A large literature, beginning with Fair (1978), finds that economic downturns hurt sitting politicians. Margalit (2011) and Jensen et al. (2017) show that voters also punish incumbents for the adverse effects of import competition.

[7] Whereas it is challenging to interpret the electoral consequences of county-level congressional vote shares—which are aggregated across gerrymandered congressional districts—one can readily study vote shares of presidential elections, given that all counties choose among the same set of candidates. In section 6, we show that over the 2000 to 2016 period, more trade-exposed counties saw larger gains in vote shares for the GOP presidential candidate.

With the caveat that further splits of the data increase the risk of false positives, we observe that rising trade exposure simultaneously predicts a rise in the odds that majority white non-Hispanic areas elect GOP conservatives and the odds that majority non-white areas elect liberal Democrats. Of course, majority white non-Hispanic districts vastly outnumber majority-minority districts. In both sets of districts, candidates advantaged by adverse trade shocks appear to pull support from moderate Democrats. Consequently, it is the GOP that gains *in net* from trade shocks.

Why does greater trade exposure appear to engender stronger support for more ideological extreme candidates? One canonical explanation is resource competition. Because adverse trade shocks increase local uptake of government transfers (Autor et al., 2013a) and reduce local tax revenues (Feler and Senses, 2015), they are likely to intensify competition for government funds. To the extent that white voters disadvantaged by economic changes see GOP conservatives as favoring their interests over those of other groups—while disadvantaged minority voters see liberal Democrats as their champions—we would expect the political response to a common shock to vary by race (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Parker and Barreto 2014; Kuziemko and Washington 2018), an implication that our analysis confirms across multiple outcome measures.

A more encompassing explanation for why trade protectionism and identity-based politics co-occur in districts facing rising trade exposure is found in the behavioral general-equilibrium frameworks of Grossman and Helpman (2018) and Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019). Introducing social-identity theory into an otherwise standard trade model, Grossman and Helpman (2018) show how adverse economic shocks—due, e.g., to globalization—may precipitate both a psychological response that strengthens one's identification with a particular social group—e.g., the white working class—and a material interest in stronger trade protection. Intensified foreign competition (or other adverse shocks) may thus increase the political salience of racial and ethnic identities among voters, along with support for nationalist economic policies.

Extending this reasoning outside the (exclusive) realm of trade policy, Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019) study the interplay between economic and social policy in a setting where low and high-income voters may shift allegiances between either a class-based identity, where taxation and redistribution are salient, or a culture-based identity, where nationalist and tribal sentiments are foregrounded. Adverse economic shocks in this setting can heighten cultural identity at the expense of class identity, or vice-versa, with potentially unconventional effects on policy. Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019) illustrate one scenario where, as globalization accelerates, the locus of group identity switches from class conflict to nationalist versus cosmopolitan (cultural) conflict. As this occurs, the losers from globalization become more protectionist and *reduce* their demands for redistribution.

Because right-wing populist movements tend to arise during times of economic hardship (Hutch-

ings and Valentino, 2004; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Algan et al., 2017), a related explanation for the co-occurrence of heightened animus towards both foreign trading partners and foreign-born individuals stems from political opportunism. Glaeser et al. (2005) formalize this intuition in a model where politicians deploy strategic extremism (e.g., inflaming wedge issues) to amplify cultural identification and thereby raise turnout among core supporters. We suspect that the identity-based and opportunism-based motivations are strategic complements, with adverse shocks triggering group-identity shifts, and politicians exploiting these shifts for electoral gain.

Although we cannot definitively separate resource-based versus identity-based explanations for the political outcomes we observe, both the Gennaioli-Tabellini and Grossman-Helpman frameworks make a prediction that is not directly addressed by resource-based approaches, which is that trade shocks increase support for protectionism—an implication strongly confirmed by Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).[8] One alternative explanation for our primary findings that we *can* reject is that they are merely a byproduct of a secular trend favoring conservatives. That trade shocks appear to catalyze support for more-extreme actors in *both* parties, at the expense of moderates, indicates that we are not simply capturing a general rightward shift in U.S. politics.

Given that the GOP has endorsed the principle of free trade since the 1950s (Irwin, 2017), it may appear paradoxical that trade shocks *both* increase support for protectionism *and* advantage Republican candidates. One resolution is found in the Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) result that support for protectionism is pervasive in trade-exposed districts, irrespective of party. They estimate that import competition raises support for protectionist trade bills by an equal extent in safe Democratic and safe Republican districts, and about twice as much in competitive districts.[9]

The U.S. is not alone of course in seeing economic adversity strengthen the electoral prospects of right-wing politicians. During the Great Depression, far-right movements had greater success in European countries that had more prolonged downturns (De Bromhead et al., 2013). Today, French and German regions more exposed to trade with low-wage countries have seen larger increases in vote shares for the far right (Dippel et al., 2017; Malgouyres, 2017), British regions more exposed

[8] In related work, Kleinberg and Fordham (2013) and Kuk et al. (2015) find that legislators from districts harder hit by the China trade shock are more likely to support foreign-policy legislation that rebukes China. For other work on how congressional representatives vote on trade legislation, see Bailey and Brady (1998), Baldwin and Magee (2000), Hiscox (2002), and Milner and Tingley (2011). On labor-market shocks and support for protectionism, see Colantone and Stanig (2018b) on Europe and Di Tella and Rodrik (2019) on the U.S.

[9] In the 19^{th} and early 20^{th} centuries, the GOP was protectionist, given its bases of support in manufacturing-oriented states in the Midwest and Northeast (Irwin, 2017). Suspicion of trade agreements on the right is not novel in the post-War era. Members of the Republican Liberty Caucus and the House Freedom Caucus, two groups of right-wing GOP legislators in the House, opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a recent major trade deal, and are frequent critics of the WTO. Several decades earlier, the conservative stalwart Senator Barry Goldwater opposed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which enabled the president to negotiate tariff reductions in the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. In contemporary public opinion polls, GOP voters are wary of trade accords. A recent survey of the Pew Research Center (2016) indicates that 53% of voters who identify or lean Republican, as compared to 34% of voters who identify or lean Democrat, see free-trade agreements as a "bad thing for the U.S."

to trade with China voted more strongly in favor of Brexit (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a), and EU regions more exposed to the Great Recession have seen a greater rise in voting for anti-establishment, Euro-skeptic parties (Algan et al., 2017; Dehdari, 2018; Dal Bo et al., 2019).[10]

Our work differs from existing literature by documenting an ideological realignment that manifests itself in a wide range of outcomes beyond vote shares, and includes patterns of polarization rather than a uniform shift in ideology. The broad body of evidence that we evaluate suggests that trade shocks favored conservative views and politicians overall, where these gains came at the expense of centrist rather than left-wing forces, and reflected an ideological repositioning of majority-white versus majority-non-white regions. While the evidence we find across multiple domains supports the inference that the China trade shock was a causal contributor to the post-2000 ideological realignment, it would be premature to view this evidence as dispositive. Further work and additional years of outcome data will be required to ascertain whether these shifts to the extremes persist and cohere in the long run, or whether they prove transitory and perhaps incidental.

In section 2, we describe our data on political beliefs, media viewership, and campaign contributions, and next summarize our data on local labor markets, how we match these markets to congressional districts, and how we account for congressional redistricting in section 3. We present our empirical results on the impacts of trade shocks on political expression in section 4, on legislator ideology in section 5, and on presidential voting in section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 National Trends in Political Expression and Partisanship

We begin by considering how political expression in the U.S. has changed over time. To account for myriad forms of political engagement, we study three disparate types of expression. Surveys of public opinion from the Pew Research Center provide direct information on the political beliefs of potential voters; Nielsen data on the ratings of cable news networks capture the relative standing of right-leaning FOX News and more left-leaning MSNBC and CNN; and DIME measures of campaign contributions indicate how donor support for candidates has shifted along the ideological spectrum. These data reveal the demand side for ideology, which we will later use to examine which viewpoints and sentiments have been most emboldened by adverse trade shocks.

2.1 Changes in Voter Beliefs on Political Issues

We use data from the Pew Research Center to measure changes in voter ideology over time (Pew Research Center, 2014b, 2015).[11] Pew periodically asks U.S. adult survey participants a consistent

[10] Political scientists suggest that ideology of the GOP may be in flux, shifting from laissez-faire policy and limited government towards nationalism and ethnic identity (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Mann and Ornstein, 2016).

[11] Other surveys of political beliefs, including the American National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, and the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, do not suit our purposes due to timing or limited sample size.

set of questions about their political beliefs. In each of ten questions, participants choose which of two opposing statements on a topic—one left-leaning, one right-leaning—best reflects their opinion. Appendix Table S1 enumerates these questions.[12] By coding agreement with left-leaning and right-leaning statements as -1 and +1, respectively, Pew constructs a measure of the left–right distribution of political beliefs on the $[-10, +10]$ interval, which we refer to as the Pew ideology score. We use data on political beliefs, rather than party identification, because beliefs directly reflect ideology whereas party attachment may not (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016).[13]The data show both a rightward shift and a strong polarization in participant political beliefs over the 2000s. In panel A of Table 1, which pools all respondents, the mean ideology score among all respondents increased from -0.91 to -0.61 from 2004 to 2015, corresponding to one more survey item with a right-leaning answer for every seven respondents.[14] The fraction of participants whose ideology was centrist (Pew score of -2 to 2) fell from 48.7% in 2004 to 42.2% in 2011 and declined further to 37.6% in 2015. The fraction of participants whose ideology was mostly or strongly conservative (Pew score of 3 to 10) rose from 18.6% in 2004 to 26.9% in 2015, with most of this change occurring by 2011. The fraction whose ideology was mostly or strongly liberal (Pew score of -3 to -10) rose more modestly from 32.6% to 35.4% over the 2004-2015 time frame.

Panels B and C of Table 1 documents that both levels of and changes in political beliefs vary markedly by race and ethnicity. The rightward shift in ideology evident in panel A of the table is due almost entirely to the preferences of non-Hispanic whites. Between 2004 and 2015, the share of whites with conservative beliefs rose sharply from 22.2% to 35.0%, while among Hispanics and non-whites, the prevalence of liberal beliefs increased from 37.3% to 44.0%. In both cases, the rise in the share of group members with strongly ideological affiliations (liberal or conservative) is fully offset by a reduction in those holding moderate views.[15] These patterns revealing increasing polarization of left-right beliefs between non-Hispanic whites and other groups provide a key motivation for our subsequent exploration of the potentially divergent responses among minority and non-minority residents in trade-exposed electoral districts.

[12]Other work that uses Pew data to study polarization includes Gentzkow et al. (2019), while Gentzkow (2016) discusses alternative measures of political polarization used in the literature. Survey data that measure respondents' views of the other party rather than their views on specific issues find a sharp rise in polarization in the mid-1990s—suggesting an increase in party salience. Data that track polarization of specific issue positions, however, do not find a rise of polarization until the mid-2000s (Gentzkow, 2016).

[13]We obtained from Pew unpublished geocoded microdata for its surveys in 2004, 2011, 2014, and 2015, yielding a pooled sample of 20,785 observations. We retain all survey respondents who reside in the 48 mainland states, and drop the 0.6% of observations that have incomplete demographic information. Microdata prior to 2004 were unavailable.

[14]Changing a survey response from left-leaning to right-leaning raises the ideology score by 2 points (+1 instead of -1); the increase in average score by 0.30 corresponds to $0.30/2 = 0.15$ additional right-leaning answers per person.

[15]The mean ideology score of white non-Hispanics increased from -0.63 to 0.09 from 2004 to 2015, corresponding to one more right-leaning answer for every three respondents. Simultaneously, the mean ideology score of Hispanics and non-whites shifted leftwards from -1.65 to -1.97, meaning one more left-leaning answer for every six respondents. Thus the ideological distance between whites and other groups roughly doubled.

Table 1: Levels of and Changes in Ideological Affiliations of U.S. Residents, Overall and by White Non-Hispanic Status, between 2004 and 2015 Using Pew Ideology Score

Year	Mean Score (1)	% Liberal (2)	% Moderate (3)	% Conservative (4)
		A. All Races and Ethnicities		
2004	-0.91	32.6	48.7	18.6
2011	-0.30	31.2	42.2	26.6
2014	-0.59	34.5	39.3	26.2
2015	-0.61	35.4	37.6	26.9
Δ2004-15	0.30	2.8	-11.1	8.3
		B. Non-Hispanic Whites		
2004	-0.63	30.9	46.9	22.2
2011	0.39	27.1	38.7	34.1
2014	0.02	30.9	36.0	33.1
2015	0.09	31.0	33.9	35.0
Δ2004-15	0.71	0.1	-13.0	12.9
		C. Hispanics and Non-Whites		
2004	-1.65	37.3	53.5	9.2
2011	-1.83	40.1	49.7	10.2
2014	-1.92	42.3	46.5	11.3
2015	-1.97	44.0	44.8	11.1
Δ2004-15	-0.32	6.7	-8.6	1.9

Notes: The Pew Ideology score ranges from -10 (most liberal) to +10 (most conservative). Columns 2-4 define liberals as those with scores of -10 to -3, moderates as those with scores from -2 to 2, and conservatives as those with scores from 3 to 10. Sample sizes of survey respondents living in the 48 mainland states are 2,000 in 2004, 3,029 in 2011, 9,919 in 2014, and 5,966 in 2015. Observations are weighted by survey weights.

2.2 Changes in Cable News Viewing Habits of Households

As a second measure of the ideological orientation of the American public, we exploit the distinct role of the cable-TV FOX News Channel in national political life. In a break with long-standing convention in network TV programming, FOX News, since its launch in 1996, has openly supported Republican politicians and viewpoints and opposed Democratic ones. Based on the documented connection between FOX News and conservative politics (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017), we use viewership of the channel as an indication of household demand for partisan media content.[16] We compare ratings for FOX News with ratings for the other two large

[16]Using text analysis of TV news transcripts over 1998 to 2012 and the speech of congressional representatives with known ideological positions, Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) classify the content of FOX News as strongly right of center, the content of CNN as modestly left of center, and the content of MSNBC as similar to CNN until 2009,

cable news networks, CNN and MSNBC. We focus on cable news networks rather than network TV news (ABC, CBS, NBC, and PBS) because cable news provides news programming during all or nearly all prime-time hours, whereas the other networks devote only a small share of their content and messaging to news (typically 30 minutes nightly).

Our ratings data are from Nielsen Local TV View (Nielsen Media Research, 2018) which tracks TV viewing in U.S. households. Nielsen measures the size of the audience for a given programming hour of a given TV show on a given network using electronic monitors attached to household TV sets and viewer diaries. Nielsen ratings indicate the fraction of all TV-owning households that are tuned to a particular program at a particular time. We obtained average ratings for the 5pm to 11pm time-slot, Monday through Friday, which is prime time for cable news programming. Our data cover 2004 to 2016, with underlying sample sizes ranging from 99,000 to 119,000 households in each month during which Nielsen conducts ratings "sweeps" (February, May, July, November). To align news viewership with the demand for political content, we focus on ratings for cable news in the month of November during presidential election years. Ratings for cable news spike during presidential election months, averaging 3.9% versus 2.7% in non-election months during our sample period. The data record average ratings for the households of each county, which we use in later analysis to examine how exposure to local trade shocks affects the viewership of cable news networks.

Figure 1 shows average national November ratings for the three major cable TV news channels. Aggregating the networks' viewing audience, overall ratings for cable TV news rose from 2.37% in 2004 to 3.86% in 2016, meaning that the average fraction of households that were tuned to a cable news channel during prime-time hours in November rose by 1.5 percentage points in these twelve years. In all years, FOX News is the dominant network. Its ratings rose from 1.36% in 2004 to 2.04% in 2016, while its share of cable news viewers declined modestly from 57.5% in 2004 to 52.8% in 2016. Since 2004, the news viewing of the American public has modestly polarized. Ratings during presidential-election months have increased more substantially for right-leaning FOX News (+0.7 percentage points) and left-leaning MSNBC (+0.5 percentage points) than for less stridently partisan CNN (+0.3 percentage points).

and further left thereafter. Utilizing geographic variation in the post-1996 rollout of access to FOX News, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) find that, relative to towns without FOX News access, towns exposed to the channel had larger 1996-to-2000 gains in votes shares for GOP presidential and senatorial candidates. Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) document that over the 2000 to 2012 period, the conservative slant of FOX News intensified further, and its positive impact on voting for the GOP strengthened.

Figure 1: November Nielsen Ratings for Cable TV News Networks, 2004 – 2016



Notes: Nielsen ratings indicate the fraction of all TV-owning households that are tuned to a particular program at a particular time. Figure plots average ratings for the 5pm to 11pm time-slot, Monday through Friday, during the month of November for years 2004 through 2016. Sample size for each November estimate ranges from 99,000 to 119,000 households.

In Appendix Figure S1, we separate Nielsen households according to the race and ethnicity of the household head and find further evidence of diverging political leaning between non-Hispanic whites and other groups. The 2004 to 2016 FOX News gain in ratings is large among households headed by non-Hispanic whites and negligible among households headed by non-whites, relatively few of which are FOX viewers. For MSNBC, the ratings gains among white-headed households are slightly smaller than among non-white-headed households.

2.3 Changes in the Ideology of Campaign Contributors and Congress Members

We use the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME; Bonica, 2013, 2018) to measure the political ideology of campaign contributors and legislators. Based on reports mandated by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), DIME tabulates campaign contributions by donor and recipient for all amounts in excess of $200. DIME encapsulates the ideology of campaign donors and electoral candidates in a campaign finance (CF) score, which is based on the solution to a spatial model of contributions. Bonica (2013) proposes that donors choose contributions to each candidate to maximize the difference between the net benefit they derive from giving to candidates in general and the loss they experience when giving to particular candidates whose ideological positions differ from their own. Applying the model to the universe of FEC-registered campaign donors and candidates for state and national electoral offices, he estimates the ideal points for each entity in the data (i.e.,

campaign donors and candidates for elected office), which are the CF scores.

Illustrating the operation of the spatial model, the largest conservative donors, measured by their CF score in the DIME database, include Associated Builders and Contractors (anti-environmental regulation), the National Rifle Association (pro-gun rights), and the National Right to Life Political Action Committee (anti-abortion); the largest liberal donors include the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (pro-plaintiff rights), the Service Employees International Union (pro-labor), and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (pro-public sector). Because donors in the first group give to similar candidates, few if any of whom are supported by donors in the second group, and vice versa, the model solution will give extreme CF scores in one direction to donor-candidate combinations in the first group and extreme CF scores in the other direction to donor-candidate combinations in the second group.[17]

Evidence indicates that the CF measure has high construct validity. Even controlling for legislator party affiliation, CF scores for members of Congress are strongly positively correlated with the likelihood that a representative voted in favor of legislation deemed as conservative (e.g., stronger immigration enforcement) and strongly negatively correlated with the likelihood that a representative supported legislation deemed liberal (e.g., the Affordable Care Act). See Bonica (2019).[18]

Basic versions of CF scores assume that a politician's ideology is time-invariant even over a decades-long tenure in Congress, which is unappealing for our analysis that studies changes in ideology over time. To address this limitation, we derive time-varying ideology scores for candidates by computing the contribution-weighted-average of the time-invariant CF donor scores of each candidate's donors in each electoral cycle.[19] In so doing, we follow the political science literature in interpreting a donor's choice of which candidates to support to be a genuine expression of the donor's ideology (Bonica, 2013; McCarty et al., 2016). Aggregating over contributions to candi-

[17] Donors who give widely to candidates, and candidates who receive contributions from a wide variety of donors will have intermediate CF scores. Moderate donors include corporate PACs intent on avoiding the appearance of undue partisanship, such as the National Auto Dealer's Association or the National Beer Wholesaler's Association.

[18] Poole and Rosenthal (1985) and Poole and Rosenthal (2007) pioneered the use of spatial models for measuring the ideology of political actors, an approach that has been widely emulated and extensively applied (see, e.g., Nokken and Poole, 2004; McCarty et al., 2016). Poole and Rosenthal's original measures of legislator ideology, the Nominate and DW-Nominate scores, are based on Congressional roll-call votes. Relative to Nominate scores, a key advantage of the Campaign Finance (CF) used in this paper is that it measures the ideological affiliations of both election winners (who subsequently cast votes in Congress) and for the entire pool of campaign donors (measuring partisan engagement), irrespective of whether their candidate prevails. This enables our study of the effect of trade exposure on the ideological affiliation of both donors and the candidates elected.

[19] The computation of legislator ideal points from roll-call votes faces the challenge that each Congress votes on a different set of bills that represent different topical issues to a varying degree (Bonica, 2017). Comparing the ideology of legislators who have served in different Congresses and never cast votes on the same bills requires strong parametric restrictions on the change over time in ideology of legislators who served in multiple Congresses. The time-varying DW-Nominate score of Poole and Rosenthal (2007), which we studied in an earlier version of this paper (Autor et al., 2016b), applies a linear time trend. During the period of 2002 to 2010, there is a high correlation of 0.66 between the change in the time-varying CF score and the change in the linear-trend DW-Nominate, and both legislator ideology scores yield similar results in our empirical analysis, as documented in section 5.2.

dates in a given election reveals the relative demand for ideology by donors in that election, and aggregating over the CF scores of donors to a particular candidate reveals the relative demand for that candidate's ideological position. For the Congress elected in 2002, the correlation between our time-varying legislator CF-score and the time-invariant CF-score of Bonica (2013) is 0.97, while the correlation with the time-varying DW-Nominate score of Poole and Rosenthal (2007) is 0.92.

Figure 2: Polarization in Campaign Financing by Campaign Donor Type, 2002 – 2016



Notes: Calculations based on Data Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME; Bonica, 2013). Donor ideology is divided into ideology terciles based on campaign contributions in 2002 ranked by dollar-weighted CF scores. Liberal, moderate and conservative donors have CF scores that respectively fall into the first, second and third tercile of the CF score distribution. The height of each bar in each reported year reflects the share of all contributions (in dollars) falling within each 2002 ideology tercile.

Figure 2 summarizes campaign contributions to all candidates in primary and general congressional elections from 2002 to 2016, where we group donors based on terciles of CF scores in 2002. The first tercile comprises the most liberal donors, while the third tercile comprises the most conservative donors. By construction, each group accounts for one-third of contributions in the initial year, 2002. Over time, the contribution shares of each group will deviate from one-third, if contributing donors skew to the right and (or) to the left. Such skewing is abundantly evident: the share of contributions by conservative (3^{rd} tercile) donors rises to 0.42 in 2010, a level maintained through 2016; the share of contributions by liberal (1^{st} tercile) donors first rises to 0.42 in 2008 and then declines to 0.35 in 2010, a level maintained through 2016. These changes imply that the share of contributions by centrist donors has declined over time, dropping to 0.23 in 2010 and remaining at that level through 2016. The composition of campaign contributions has thus become more polarized.

The DIME database identifies whether donors are individuals, corporations, or non-corporate organizations (e.g., labor unions; single-issue, single-candidate or single-party political action com-

mittees). Over 2002 to 2016, donations by individuals remained roughly stable at around one-half of all contributions, while the corporation share in contributions fell (from 27.9% to 11.0%) and the non-corporate-organization share rose (from 19.9% to 37.7%). In Appendix Figure S2, we decompose these contributions by donor type according to the same CF-score terciles used in Figure 2.[20] Figure S2 reveals cleavages in ideological positioning by donor type. While centrist donors dominate among corporations—perhaps reflecting the desire of business to remain in the good graces of whichever party is in control of Congress—liberals and conservatives dominate among individual and non-corporate donors.[21] Over time, the share of moderates in contributions by type fell for both corporations and individuals, while it rose from low levels among non-corporate organizations. The share of conservatives in contributions rose most strongly for non-corporate organizations. In concert, rightward and leftward shifts in aggregate contributions by individual donors have combined with a rightward shift in non-corporate donors and a decline in (relatively moderate) corporate donations to generate the polarization of campaign finance seen in Figure 2.

Figure 3 depicts the well known pattern of partisan polarization in the House of Representatives. We plot the central tendency of contribution-weighted-average CF scores for Democratic and Republican congressional election winners from 1992 to 2016, where we normalize CF scores by the party-specific mean CF score in 1992 in order to highlight between-party polarization. Ideological polarization is thus evident whether we examine the ideological composition of campaign donors or average ideology by party among elected representatives.[22]

[20] We continue to define the boundaries of CF terciles across all donors to facilitate comparisons across donor categories. Consequently, donations by individuals, corporations, and organizations may be unequally distributed across these terciles, even in the initial year, 2002.

[21] Bonica (2016) shows that whereas corporate political action committees tend to have moderate CF scores, the scores of corporate executives and directors are decidedly more ideological, with a strong majority of these elites giving to GOP candidates and having relatively high (i.e., conservative) CF scores. In the 2000s and 2010s, nearly all senior executives and directors of Fortune 500 companies gave to political campaigns.

[22] Over 1992 to 2016, the mean CF score for congressional representatives is roughly centered on zero (μ= 0.11, σ= 0.52 in the average year). Naturally, parties already demonstrated strong ideological differences in 1992. The initial mean CF score for GOP congressional legislators was 0.40 (σ= 0.20), whereas that for Democrats was −0.23 (σ= 0.26). Republican legislators have become more conservative in terms of the donors that support their elections, with their average CF score rising by 0.10 from 1992 to 2002 and by 0.10 again from 2002 to 2016, with the total 1992-2016 change equal to one ($[0.60 - 0.40]/0.20$) standard deviation of the Republican CF score in the initial year. Democrats have become more liberal, with average CF scores falling by 0.14 from 1992 to 2002 and by 0.02 from 2002 to in 2016, where the total drop equals nearly two thirds ($[0.39 - 0.23]/0.26$) of a standard-deviation.

Figure 3: Polarization in Campaign Finance Scores for Congressional Legislators, 1992 – 2016



Notes: Figure reports the central tendency of contribution-weighted-average CF scores of campaign donors for Democratic and Republican congressional election winners from 1992 to 2016, where CF scores are normalized by the party-specific mean CF score in 1992. The initial mean CF score for GOP congressional legislators was 0.40 (σ= 0.26) and −0.23 (σ= 0.20) for Republicans and Democrats, respectively, in 1992.

3 Measuring Local Economic and Political Change

In our analysis of Congressional elections, we examine changes over 2002 to 2016 in the ideological positioning of contributors to election campaigns and the candidates who win these elections. Within our period, the 2002 and 2010 elections are respectively the first and last whose congressional district boundaries are based on the 2000 Census. In 2012, states defined new districts, based on population counts in the 2010 Census and the constitutional mandate that each district contain approximately $1/435^{th}$ of the U.S. population. When analyzing 2002 to 2010, we study a period that spans the primary force of the China trade shock (Autor et al., 2016a; Brandt et al., 2017a), and within which district boundaries are largely stable. When extending our analysis beyond 2010, we address the longer run impacts of economic shocks on electoral outcomes, but must confront the measurement inconsistencies created by redistricting. To balance concerns over measurement error due to redistricting with interest in the persistence of shocks on our outcomes, we study both the 2002-2010 and 2002-2016 periods. In most cases, we omit observations spanning the 2010-2012 seam except for the small set of districts that retain consistent boundaries during this window.

3.1 Local Labor Market Exposure to Trade

Our empirical analysis employs the specification of local trade exposure in commuting zones (CZs) derived by Autor et al. (2014) and Acemoglu et al. (2016). CZs are clusters of adjoining counties

that have the commuting structure of a local labor market (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996; Dorn, 2009). For each CZ j, we measure the shock experienced by a local labor market as the average change in Chinese import penetration in that CZ's industries, weighted by the share of each industry k in the CZ's initial employment:

$$\Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu} = \sum_{k} \frac{L_{jkt}}{L_{jt}} \Delta IP_{k\tau}^{cu}. \tag{1}$$

In this expression, $\Delta IP_{k\tau}^{cu} = \Delta M_{k\tau}^{cu}/(Y_{k0} + M_{k0} - X_{k0})$ is the growth of Chinese import penetration in the U.S. for an industry k over period τ, computed as the growth in U.S. imports from China during the outcome period, $\Delta M_{k\tau}^{cu}$, divided by initial absorption (U.S. industry shipments plus net imports, $Y_{k0} + M_{k0} - X_{k0}$) in the base period 1991, near the start of China's export boom. The fraction L_{jkt}/L_{jt} is the share of industry k in CZ j's total employment, as measured in County Business Patterns data prior to the outcome period in the year 2000.

In (1), the difference in $\Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu}$ across commuting zones stems from variation in local industry employment structure at the start of period t. This variation arises from two sources: differential concentration of employment in manufacturing versus non-manufacturing activities and specialization in import-intensive industries within local manufacturing.[23] In our main specifications, we control for the start-of-period manufacturing share within CZs so as to focus on variation in exposure to trade arising from differences in industry mix within local manufacturing.

An issue for the estimation is that realized U.S. imports from China in (1) may be correlated with industry import-demand shocks. In this case, OLS estimates of the relationship between changes in imports from China and changes in U.S. manufacturing employment may understate the impact of the pure supply shock component of rising Chinese import competition, as both U.S. employment and imports may rise simultaneously in the face of unobserved positive shocks to U.S. product demand. To identify the causal effect of rising Chinese import exposure on local-level political outcomes, we employ an instrumental-variables strategy that accounts for the potential endogeneity of U.S. trade exposure. We exploit the fact that during our sample period, much of the growth in Chinese imports stems from the rising competitiveness of Chinese manufacturers, which is a supply shock from the perspective of U.S. producers. China's lowering of trade barriers (Bai et al., 2017), dismantling of the constraints associated with central planning (Naughton, 2007; Hsieh and Song, 2015), and accession to the WTO (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Handley and Limao, 2017) have contributed to an immense increase in the country's manufacturing productivity and a concomitant rise in the country's manufacturing exports (Hsieh and Ossa, 2016; Brandt et al., 2017a).[24] China's aggressive

[23] Differences in manufacturing employment are not the primary source of variation. In a bivariate regression, the start-of-period manufacturing employment share explains less than 40 percent of the variation in $\Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu}$.

[24] China may have intentionally undervalued its exchange rate in the early 2000s, which may have contributed to its export growth in the first half of the decade (Bergsten and Gagnon, 2017).

market opening appears to have ended in the late 2000s (Naughton, 2018; Lardy, 2019), after which point the government took a heavier hand in guiding the country's industrial development.

We identify the supply-driven component of Chinese imports by instrumenting for growth in Chinese imports to the U.S. using the contemporaneous composition and growth of Chinese imports in eight other developed countries.[25] Specifically, we instrument the measured import-exposure variable $\Delta IP^{cu}_{j\tau}$ with a non-U.S. exposure variable $\Delta IP^{co}_{j\tau}$ that is constructed using data on industry-level growth of Chinese exports to other high-income markets:

$$\Delta IP^{co}_{j\tau} = \sum_k \frac{L_{jkt-10}}{L_{jt-10}} \Delta IP^{co}_{k\tau}. \tag{2}$$

This expression for non-U.S. exposure to Chinese imports differs from the expression in equation (1) in two respects. In place of U.S. imports by industry ($\Delta M^{cu}_{k\tau}$) in the computation of industry-level import penetration $\Delta IP^{cu}_{k\tau}$, it uses realized imports from China by other high-income markets ($\Delta M^{co}_{k\tau}$) in $\Delta IP^{co}_{k\tau}$, and it replaces all other variables with lagged values to mitigate any simultaneity bias.[26] As documented by Autor et al. (2016a), all eight comparison countries used for the instrumental variables analysis witnessed import growth from China in at least 343 of the 397 total set of four-digit SIC manufacturing industries. Moreover, cross-country, cross-industry patterns of imports are strongly correlated with the U.S., with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.55 (Switzerland) to 0.96 (Australia). That China made comparable gains in penetration by detailed sector across numerous countries in the same time interval suggests that China's falling prices, rising quality, and declining trade costs in these surging sectors are root causes of its manufacturing export growth.[27] Because China's market-oriented reforms accelerated with its WTO accession in 2001 and had largely run their course by the end of the 2000s, we define our measure of the China trade shock in (1) and our instrument for this shock in (2) to span the period 2002 to 2010.

Data on international trade are from the UN Comtrade Database, which gives bilateral imports for six-digit HS products.[28] To concord these data to four-digit SIC industries, we first apply the crosswalk in Pierce and Schott (2012), which assigns ten-digit HS products to four-digit SIC industries (at which level each HS product maps into a single SIC industry), and then aggregate

[25] These eight other high-income countries are those that have comparable trade data covering the full sample period: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland.

[26] The start-of-period employment shares L_{jkt}/L_{jt} are replaced by their 10-year lag, while initial absorption in the expression for industry-level import penetration is replaced by its 3-year lag.

[27] A potential concern for our analysis is that it ignores U.S. exports to China, focusing instead on trade flows in the opposite direction. This focus is dictated by the fact that our instrument, by construction, has less predictive power for U.S. exports to China. To a first approximation, China's economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s generated a substantial shock to the supply of U.S. imports but only a modest change in the demand for U.S. exports. During our sample period, imports from China were nearly five times as large as manufacturing exports from the U.S. to China.

[28] See http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx.

to six-digit HS products and four-digit SIC industries (at which level some HS products map into multiple SIC entries). For this aggregation, we use data on U.S. import values at the ten-digit HS level, averaged over 1995 to 2005. Dollar amounts are inflated to dollar values in 2015 using the PCE deflator. Data on CZ employment by industry from the County Business Patterns for the years 1990 and 2000 is used to compute employment shares by industry in (1) and (2).

Appendix Table S2 summarizes trade exposure defined at the CZ level, which we then match to, variously, Nielsen households by CZ of residence, electoral outcomes in county-congressional district cells, and voting results by CZ in presidential elections. Through most of our analysis, we use the 2002 to 2010 period to characterize the rise in import competition from China.[29] This period corresponds with China's post-WTO-accession productivity boom and its most intense increase in import penetration in the U.S. On average, Chinese import penetration grew by 0.71 percentage points between 2002 and 2010 (column 1 of Appendix Table S2). In section 4, we use the interquartile range of the increase in trade exposure as a metric to scale estimated treatments of trade exposure on political outcomes in more versus less-exposed districts. This range is 0.49 percentage points across the full set of congressional districts in our analysis.

3.2 Political Outcomes in County-by-Congressional-District Cells

To map economic outcomes in commuting zones to political outcomes in congressional districts, we define the geographic unit of our main analysis to be the county-by-congressional-district cell. The building blocks of congressional districts are census tracts, whose amalgamation allows officials to construct districts that meet the requirements of contiguity and equal population size within a state. The resulting map of congressional districts frequently splits counties and CZs between multiple districts. We overlay this map with the map of county boundaries to obtain county-by-district cells, which allow us to nest the geographies of economic and political outcomes. We ascribe to each county-district cell the CZ-level trade shock that corresponds to the county and weight each cell by its share of the voting-age population in the district, such that each congressional district has equal weight in the analysis. If a district spans multiple CZs, the economic factors that are mapped to the district will be a population-share-weighted average of the values in these CZs.[30]

To illustrate how we construct country-by-congressional-district cells, consider North Carolina's 12th congressional district, which connects parts of the cities of Charlotte, Greensboro and Winston-Salem along a narrow corridor (see Appendix Figure S3). Rowan County overlaps with the 12th

[29]The 2002 to 2010 window is the initial outcome period for our analysis of congressional elections. We also study presidential elections starting from 2000 to 2008 and beyond, and correspondingly measure the growth of import competition over the period of 2000 to 2008 there.

[30]From the full sample of 435 congressional districts, we omit Alaska's one congressional district and Hawaii's two congressional districts because CZs are difficult to define for these states. The resulting set of 3,772 county-district cells covers all 432 congressional districts on the U.S. mainland.

district in its center, but also with the 5th district in its Northwest, and with the 8th district in its Southeast. Our data contain a separate observation for each of these county-district cells. To each cell, we attach information on the elected representatives for the corresponding district (for cells in Rowan Country from the 5th, 8th, or 12th), and the economic conditions of the commuting zone (Charlotte) to which the county (Rowan) belongs. In our analysis, the weight attached to each cell equals the cell's share of the voting-age population in its corresponding congressional district.

Data on election outcomes in county-district cells are from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Elections (Leip, 2017) which tracks votes received by Democratic, Republican, and other candidates for Congress in each county within each congressional district, and in each election year. We use these data to tabulate the shares of votes won by Democratic and GOP congressional candidates in each county-by-district cell in 2002, as well as the change in these values between 2002 and later years. The Leip data also provides the number of registered voters at the county level, which allows us to compute voter turnout by county.[31] The information from the DIME database (Bonica 2013, 2014) on campaign contributions and the inferred ideology of congressional legislators matches into our county-by-district geography at the congressional district level.

In addition to our analysis of congressional elections, we also study Leip data on vote shares in presidential elections, Nielsen data on TV consumption, and survey responses from PEW. All of these data are reported at the level of counties, and do not depend on the (changing) boundaries of congressional districts. In our analysis of presidential voting, we use county-level vote shares for the nominees of the two major parties in 2000, 2008, and 2016.

3.3 Adjusting for Redistricting

The initial period for our analysis of congressional elections is 2002 to 2010. This period encompasses the most rapid rise of import competition from China, and the measurement of changes in district-level outcomes is facilitated by stable district boundaries in almost all states. Appendix Table A1 shows the extent of redistricting in congressional elections from 2002 to 2016. In the period of 2002 to 2010, only four states implemented adjustments to their district boundaries. Between 2010 and 2012, however, nearly all districts on the US mainland (425 out of 432) changed boundaries. To extend our analysis beyond 2010 by including outcomes from congressional elections in 2012, 2014, and 2016, we thus need to account for the sweeping congressional restricting of 2012.

To match county-by-congressional-district cells across time, we construct a new crosswalk that apportions county-district cells for the 113^{th} Congress (elected in 2012), and the next two congresses, to county-district cells as defined for the 108^{th} Congress (elected in 2002). We begin by splitting each

[31] Data on registered voters are missing in some years for Georgia, Mississippi, North Dakota and Wisconsin. These four states are omitted from our empirical analysis of voter turnout.

county-district cell of the 113^{th} Congress into Census Blocks of the 2010 Census. We next create a weighted crosswalk between 2010 Census Blocks and 2000 Census Blocks, which indicates the fraction of population of a 2000 Block that maps into the boundaries of a given 2010 Block. The 2000 Blocks in turn can be mapped to county-district cells for the 108^{th} Congress. We finally aggregate the Block-to-Block crosswalk to the level of county-district cells, such that the final crosswalk indicates the fraction of population (measured in 2000) of a county-district cell for the 108^{th} Congress whose location of residence falls into a given county-district cell for the 113^{th} Congress. We also construct similar crosswalks to account for several intracensal period episodes of redistricting of individual states in the elections of 2004, 2006 and 2016.[32]

The crosswalks allow us to map outcomes from years following redistricting into the boundaries of the initial county-district cells for the 108^{th} Congress. However, we need to additionally address the fact that redistricting elevates churning in political outcomes. Panel B of Appendix Table A1 indicates the fraction of congressional districts that replaced a Democratic representative with a Republican or vice versa, separately for districts that changed boundaries and those that did not. In each election following redistricting (in 2004, 2006, 2012, and 2016), districts with boundary changes experienced much greater levels of party churning than those whose geography remained unchanged. Averaging over these elections, one out of every six districts with boundary changes (15.7%) switched parties, while only one out of every 26 districts without boundary change (3.8%) did so. The much higher churning in the former group of districts is likely a consequence of redistricting, rather than an expression of rapidly changing political preferences among voters in these districts.[33]

To purge the considerable noise caused by redistricting, we compute changes in outcome variables that omit any two-year period during which a district changed its boundaries. Our outcome variables thus take the form,

$$\Delta Y^{r}_{cd\tau} = \sum_{t \in \tau} (1 - R_{dt+2}) \left(\sum_{d'} \frac{p_{cdd'}}{p_{cd}} Y_{cd't+2} - \sum_{d'} \frac{p_{cdd'}}{p_{cd}} Y_{cd't} \right) \tag{3}$$

[32]To construct our crosswalks of county-district cells, we draw on data of the Census Bureau, the Missouri Census Data Center, and the IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System.

[33]Consider the example of Montgomery County, Alabama. From the 108^{th} Congress (elected in 2002) to the 112^{th} Congress (elected in 2010), the northwestern part of the county, which includes most of the state capital city of Montgomery, belonged to Alabama's 2nd district while the more rural southwestern part belonged to the 3rd district. Both districts elected GOP candidates in 2010, and after redistricting in 2012, the entire congressional delegation of Alabama was reelected. Despite this maximum stability in election outcomes from 2010 to 2012, some residents of Montgomery county were no longer represented by the same politician or even the by same party after the 2012 election. The 2012 redistricting moved large swaths of inner-city Montgomery from the 2nd and 3rd to the 7th district, which is Alabama's only district with a majority black population. According to our county-district crosswalk, 15% of the Montgomery county residents who belonged to the 2nd district until 2010 found themselves in the Democrat-controlled 7th district as of 2012. This change in party is likely a mechanical outcome of redistricting, and not informative about changes in the political views of Montgomery county residents.

where $\Delta Y^r_{cd\tau}$ is the redistricting-adjusted change of an outcome Y over a period τ for the cell of county c and district d of the 108^{th} Congress. The variable $Y_{cd't}$ indicates the level of the same outcome variable in a year t that is the start year of a two-year period contained in period τ. It is measured for county c and the districts d' that are used during the election in year t. The fraction $\frac{p_{cdd'}}{p_{cd}}$ indicates the population share of the initial county-district cell cd that maps to the new county-district cell cd', and R_{dt+2} is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if district d experienced boundary changes in election year $t+2$.[34] If a district experienced no boundary changes during outcome period τ, then $d' = d$, $\frac{p_{cdd'}}{p_{cd}} = 1$, and $R_{dt+2} = 0$, so that equation (3) simplifies to $\Delta Y^r_{cd\tau} = \sum_{t\in\tau}(Y_{cdt+2} - Y_{cdt})$. This sum of two-year changes contained in period τ is equivalent to the first difference of outcome variable Y between the start and end of period τ. Since there was little redistricting from 2002 to 2010, outcome variables during our main period of analysis correspond to simple first differences in most states.[35]

4 Impact of Trade Shocks on Political Expression

We now evaluate how greater trade exposure affects political expression, resource mobilization for electoral campaigns, and the political orientation of candidates who win congressional elections and presidential contests. We proceed in three stages: by examining changes in media viewership and campaign contributions in this section; by considering congressional election outcomes in section 5; and by assessing presidential voting in section 6.[36]

4.1 Cable News Market Shares for FOX, CNN, and MSNBC

We first assess how trade exposure affects political expression using Nielsen data on the cable-news-viewing habits of U.S. households. The rankings of cable news channels indicate household relative demand for ideological content. According to fivethirtyeight.com, the percentage of FOX News viewers who voted for the GOP presidential candidate exceeded the percentage of viewers who

[34] We restrict the value of $\Delta Y^r_{cd\tau}$ to lie within the range of values that could be observed for a non-adjusted change of that outcome. For instance, adjusted changes in party vote shares are restricted to -100% or +100% in the rare cases where equation (3) yields an adjusted change of more than 100%.

[35] Consider the change in the Republican vote share over the period 2002 to 2016 for the overlap between Montgomery county and Alabama's 2nd district of the 108^{th} Congress. Adding up over the four two-year periods from 2002 to 2010, the Republican vote share declined from 64% in 2002 to 41% in 2010 in this cell. We omit the two-year change during redistricting in 2010-2012, and then compute the subsequent change in Republican vote share from 2012 to 2016 as a weighted average of the change in the 85% overlap of the cell with the new 2nd district (where the Republican share increased from 47% in 2012 to 58% in 2016) and the 15% overlap the new 7th district (where the Republican vote share declined from 4% in 2012 to 0% in 2016). The redistricting-adjusted change in Republican vote share during the 2002 to 2016 period is thus $(41\% - 64\%) + 0.85(58\% - 47\%) + 0.15(0\% - 4\%) = -14\%$.

[36] In Table S14, we explore the effect of import competition on changes in political beliefs at the CZ-level using data from the Pew survey summarized above. The results from this analysis qualitatively align with those from section 4.1 on cable news market shares, but they lack precision because the survey data contain only a small number of individual-level observations per CZ.

voted for the Democratic candidate by the stunning margins of 62% in 2004 and 66% in 2016.[37] Viewers of CNN and MSNBC tend to lean Democratic. CNN and MSNBC viewers favored the Democratic over the GOP presidential candidate by 32% and 28%, respectively, in 2004, and by the wider margins of 47% and 70%, respectively, in 2016.

Because the cross-sectional Nielsen data preclude longitudinal analysis of individual viewers, we aggregate data on households by CZ and age-race groups to study whether news viewership changed differentially in CZs that faced greater trade exposure. Specifically, we aggregate the Nielsen data to the level of CZ i by age-race group g (based on the household head ages 18-34, 35-54, 55+ for non-Hispanic whites and those with other race/ethnicity) by time period t (weekday prime-time hours during 28-day windows in November of two presidential election years $t = t_1$ and $t = t_2$). The estimating equation is:

$$Y_{jgt} = \gamma_j + \gamma_g + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu} \times 1[t = t_2] + \gamma_g \times 1[t = t_2] + \beta_2 X_{jt_1} \times 1[t = t_2] + \epsilon_{jgt}. \qquad (4)$$

The dependent variable Y_{jgt} is either the combined rating of the three major news channels or the cable-news market share of a given channel (both in percentage points), measured for each CZ and age-race group in two time periods (November 2004 and November 2008, 2012, or 2016). We control for CZ, age-race group and time-period main effects $(\gamma_j, \gamma_g, \gamma_t)$ and interact the age-race-group indicators with the time dummy $(\gamma_g \times 1[t = t_2])$ to allow for time trends in TV preferences within these groups. The 2002-2010 import shock $\Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu}$ is interacted with a dummy variable $1[t = t_2]$ indicating the end period of the analysis, and we allow for region-specific time trends in a vector of control variables X_{jt_1} via an interaction with the time dummy $1[t = t_2]$. This control vector includes dummy variables for the Census geographic division to which CZ j belongs, start-of-period economic conditions in CZ j (the share of manufacturing in CZ employment, the offshorability index and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine-task-intensity index for CZ occupations, each measured in 2000) and start-of-period political conditions in CZ j (the two-party vote share of the Republican nominee in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections).

We first consider the years 2004 and 2012, a time period that overlaps with the 2002 to 2010 period for which we begin our analysis of congressional elections.[38] Panel A of Table 2 shows that greater exposure to import competition triggers little change in the combined rating of the three cable news channels. The coefficient on the trade-shock, end-year interaction is positive and marginally significant in the column 3 regression only, and falls to near zero and becomes highly imprecisely estimated when full controls are added in column 6. These results indicate that there

[37] See https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-roger-ailes-polarized-tv-news/.

[38] Nielsen data were not available prior to 2004.

is no apparent effect of trade shocks on households' *overall* consumption of TV news, even though cable news viewership does rise in the aggregate across CZs during the sample period.

Table 2: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, November 2004-November 2012. Dependent Variables: Change in TV Rating or News Channel Market Share (in % pts)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. Combined Nielsen Rating of TV News Networks					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-0.18	-0.10	0.67	0.54	0.16	0.03
[t=2012]	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.41)
	B. Market Share FOX News					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	2.86	5.87	5.09	7.31	8.32	10.48
[t=2012]	(1.49)	(2.77)	(5.03)	(4.81)	(5.21)	(5.30)
	C. Market Share CNN					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-0.51	-1.28	-6.51	-5.37	-4.34	-4.20
[t=2012]	(1.25)	(2.03)	(3.73)	(3.44)	(3.47)	(3.36)
	D. Market Share MSNBC					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-2.34	-4.58	1.42	-1.95	-3.98	-6.28
[t=2012]	(1.47)	(1.96)	(3.94)	(3.14)	(3.46)	(3.72)
Estimation Method	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage		45.4	40.6	38.3	27.7	27.7
CZ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Age-Race Group FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
CZ Industry/Occ x [t=2012]			yes	yes	yes	yes
Pres. Election Ctrls x [t=2012]				yes	yes	yes
Census Divisions x [t=2012]					yes	yes
Age-Race Group FE x [t=2012]						yes

Notes: $N = 6,923$ CZ-year-age-race cells in Panel A and $N = 5,079$ cells in panels B-D. The Combined Nielsen Rating in Panel A indicates the percentage of households that own TVs that were watching one of the three major TV news networks. Panels B-D indicate the market share of each major TV news network in their combined market. In November 2004, the average combined rating was 2.5%, and the TV news market shares were 59.2% for FOX News, 27.7% for CNN, and 13.1% for MSNBC. All regressions control for Commuting Zone, year, and age-race (three age times two race groups) fixed effects. Industry and occupation controls in column 3 include the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations, all of which are measured in 2000 and interacted with the dummy for the 2012 period. Election controls in column 4 comprise the Republican two-party vote shares of the CZ in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, each interacted with the period dummy. Census division dummies interacted with the period dummy in column 5 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Age-race-time interactions in column 6 allow for different time trends by age-race group. Observations are weighted by Nielsen's estimate of the number of TV households in each cell, and standard errors are clustered on CZs.

In panels B to D of Table 2, we examine how greater trade exposure affects the market share of individual cable-news channels. Consider the results for FOX News in panel B. In column 1, we estimate a parsimonious OLS regression that controls for CZ, age-race group, and year fixed effects only. The coefficient estimate is positive and significant at the 10% level ($t = 1.92$). Turning to the 2SLS regression in column 2, the trade-shock coefficient estimate doubles in magnitude and becomes more precisely estimated ($t = 2.12$). In the Autor et al. (2013a) analysis of the labor market

impact of increased import competition from China, instrumental variables regressions consistently indicate more adverse impacts of trade than OLS regressions. To the extent that import shocks affect political beliefs via deteriorating labor market conditions, one would expect the greater impact of imports on ideology when moving from OLS in column 1 to 2SLS in column 2. The column 2 estimates indicate that CZs with a one-percentage-point larger increase in trade exposure had a 5.9 percentage-point larger FOX News market share in 2012 relative to 2004, a period during which FOX News' presidential-election-month ratings rose but its market share fell modestly. Once we include the full set of controls for economic and political conditions in column 5, the trade-shock impact rises to 10.5 percentage points ($t = 2.00$), which implies that when comparing CZs at the 75^{th} versus 25^{th} percentiles of trade exposure, the former would have a 5.2 percentage-point (10.5×0.49) larger increase in the market share of FOX News.

That trade shocks have a positive impact on the FOX News market share implies that they must diminish market shares for CNN and (or) MSNBC, evidence for which we see in panels C and D of Table 2. The results in column 5 with full controls indicate that approximately three fifths ($-6.3/10.5$) of the FOX News gain in market share in trade-impacted CZs was at the expense of MSNBC while two-fifths ($-4.2/10.5$) of the FOX gain was at the expense of CNN, although only the first impact reaches the 10% significance level ($t = 1.70$).[39] We interpret these results to mean that greater regional exposure to import competition caused an increase in the relative demand for television news with a conservative political slant.

In Appendix Figure S4, we expand the analysis to the 2004-2008 and 2004-2016 periods, using the specification in column 6 of Table 2 with full controls. The results in Table 2 are fully replicated for these alternative horizons. Greater exposure to import competition yields no change in cable-news viewership overall, while it does reallocate market share to FOX News from MSNBC and CNN. The impact of the trade shock on FOX News market shares for the 2004-2008 ($\gamma_1 = 8.8$, $t = 2.1$) and 2004-2016 ($\gamma_1 = 10.5$, $t = 2.7$) time periods are similar to that for 2004-2012 ($\gamma_1 = 10.5$, $t = 2.0$), indicating that four-fifths of the long-run trade-shock-induced impact on FOX News was realized by 2008, by which point the China trade shock itself had almost entirely unfolded.

Motivated by the differential trends in cable news ratings according to race and ethnicity, seen in Figure S1, we report in Appendix Table S3 regressions in which we interact the trade shock with dummy variables for the six age-race groups, where the specifications are otherwise the same as in column 6 of Table 2. While the trade shock appears to spur an increase in the FOX News

[39] In supplementary estimates, presented in Appendix Table S4, we expand the sample to include all Nielsen ratings months (February, May, July, November). In the column 6 regression with full controls, we see that the impact of import competition on the FOX News market share has a slightly smaller magnitude and remains precisely estimated when we include non-presidential-election months in the analysis.

market share for most age-race groups, these gains tend to be larger and more precisely estimated for non-Hispanic whites. For the 2004 to 2016 period, these impacts are two to three times larger for non-Hispanic whites than for the corresponding Hispanic and non-white age groups.

In short, trade exposure moves the ideological needle of media consumption rightward among non-minority households. We do not classify this movement as polarization, however, since we detect no countervailing leftward shift among other groups. This is one of several instances where rightward shifts appear to be the overriding ideological and political response to trade exposure.

4.2 Ideology of Congressional Campaign Donors

We next analyze the effect of rising trade exposure on political expression as represented by the contributions of campaign donors. Contributions reveal support for candidates that arises from their appeal to donors, where larger contributions indicate, in part, a stronger ideological match between the candidate and the donor (Bonica, 2014; McCarty et al., 2016). Because we know the ideology of donors via their CF scores, we can use the distribution of contributions across these scores to assess the total demand for candidates at different points along the ideological spectrum.

In this analysis, and in our later analysis of congressional and presidential elections, we estimate equations of the form:

$$\Delta Y_{cdj\tau} = \gamma + \beta_1 \Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu} + X_{cdjt}^{'} \beta_2 + e_{cdj\tau}, \tag{5}$$

where dependent variable $\Delta Y_{cdj\tau}$ is the change in an outcome for time period τ (2002 to 2010 in our baseline specifications) that corresponds to county-congressional-district cell cd in CZ j. To our trade-exposure measure $\Delta IP_{j\tau}$, we pair an expanded vector of regional controls X_{cdjt}, which includes Census-division dummies and initial CZ economic and political conditions, as in regression equations (4) and (7), and now start-of-period demographic characteristics (population shares for nine age and four racial groups, shares of the population that are female, college educated, foreign born, and Hispanic, each measured at the county level).

We estimate (5) using as the dependent variable the change in campaign contributions for primary and general elections combined to capture the total demand for candidate ideology expressed during an electoral cycle. For the purpose of aggregation, we define bins based on quantiles for CF scores in 2002, match each donor to the bin to which the donor's CF score corresponds, and sum contributions across donors in each bin in each year for each district. To allow for zero values in some cells, we measure the change in contributions ΔC_{bjt} for bin b in district d between time periods t_1 and t_2 as,

$$\Delta C_{bd\tau} = \frac{C_{bdt_2} - C_{bdt_1}}{0.5 \times [C_{bdt_2} + C_{bdt_1}]}, \tag{6}$$

which approximates the log change in the value.

4.2.1 Baseline Results for 2002-2010

We focus first on the 2002-2010 period because congressional district boundaries are stable in this interval. Panel A of Table 3 shows the impact of greater trade exposure on the 2002-to-2010 change in total campaign contributions across all donor types irrespective of ideological affiliation across primary and general congressional elections. In column 1 of panel A, which includes no controls, districts with larger increases in trade exposure have larger increases in contributions, where this impact is significant at the 10% level ($t = 1.71$). As we add controls for initial economic conditions in column 2, geographic region in column 3, demographic characteristics in column 4, and political conditions in column 5, the coefficient estimate doubles in magnitude and remains marginally significant. The estimate with full controls in column 5 of panel A ($t = 1.77$) implies that if we compare congressional districts at the 75^{th} versus 25^{th} percentiles of trade exposure, the more-exposed district would have a 18.2% (37.2×0.49) larger increase in campaign contributions. If higher donations indicate more fiercely contested campaigns, then these results suggest that greater trade exposure increases campaign intensity.

Distinct from Panel A, the subsequent panels of Table 3 explore how trade shocks affect the *ideological composition* of campaign donations. Consider first Panel C, which shows the impact of import competition on campaign contributions by relatively moderate donors, those whose CF scores fall in the middle tercile of CF scores as of 2002. In all specifications, the coefficient estimate is small relative to the panel A estimates, and imprecisely estimated ($t = 1.20$ with full controls in column 5). By contrast, panel B shows that greater trade exposure increases contributions by left-leaning donors, defined as the sum of contributions by donors whose CF scores fall in the first tercile (most liberal) of 2002 CF scores. This impact is positive and precisely estimated in all 2SLS specifications. The coefficient estimate in column 5 ($t = 2.29$) indicates that when comparing more-versus-less trade-exposed congressional districts, the more-exposed district would have an approximately 35% (71.0×0.49) larger increase in campaign contributions by left-leaning donors. In panel D, we see a qualitatively similar pattern of impacts for contributions by right-leaning donors, defined as total contributions by donors whose CF scores fall the third tercile (most conservative) of 2002 CF scores. In column 5, the marginally significant coefficient estimate ($t = 1.70$) indicates that when comparing more-versus-less trade-exposed districts, the more-exposed district is predicted to experience a 22.6% (46.1×0.49) larger increase in contributions by right-leaning donors. These results provide our first evidence that greater trade exposure heightens *polarization,* specifically by increasing contributions among more-partisan donors on the left and right relative to contributions by moderate donors.

Table 3: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2010. Dependent Variables: Proportional Change in Contributions by Donor Ideology (in log points)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	A. All Contributions				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	15.84	28.69	33.30	38.97	37.23
	(9.24)	(21.30)	(21.12)	(21.23)	(21.05)
	B. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	25.22	58.26	64.68	71.05	71.00
	(11.69)	(27.75)	(31.31)	(31.10)	(31.06)
	C. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	8.77	14.34	22.19	25.29	23.60
	(8.15)	(18.73)	(18.62)	(19.70)	(19.63)
	D. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	9.30	34.02	44.97	49.49	46.05
	(13.00)	(26.94)	(26.98)	(27.37)	(27.15)
Estimation Method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage	35.8	37.0	27.3	29.1	29.2
2000 Industry/Occ Controls		yes	yes	yes	yes
Census Division Dummies			yes	yes	yes
2000 Demographic Controls				yes	yes
1996/2000 Pres. Election Ctrls					yes

Notes: N=3,772 county-district cells. Proportional changes are defined according to equation (6) and approximate a log change. Panels B to D indicate the change in contributions from donors whose CF score falls into the first, second, and third tercile of the dollar-weighted distribution of donor ideology in 2002. Industry and occupation controls in column 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations. Census division dummies in column 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic controls in column 4 comprise the percentage of a county's population in nine age and four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in column 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at the county level. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.

4.2.2 Extended Results for 2002-2016

Using the specification with full controls in column 5 of Table 3, we next estimate regressions for time periods beginning in 2002 and ending in each congressional election year from 2004 to 2016. The dependent variables are those in panels B to D of Table 3, which represent changes in campaign contributions by 2002 terciles of donor CF scores. The trade shock variable in these regressions is the growth of Chinese import competition from 2002 to 2010, so that the results up to 2010 are

informative about the timing of the changes in campaign contributions that Table 3 reported for the 2002-2010 period, while the results for subsequent years indicate the persistence of these effects. During 2002-2004 and 2002-2006, the full impact of the 2002-2010 China trade shock is yet to be felt; for the 2002-2008 and 2002-2010 periods forward, China's reform-driven export boom is largely complete. Up to 2010, congressional districts are stable and defined based on the distribution of population in the 2000 Census. The periods ending in 2012, 2014, and 2016 include elections based on congressional districts whose boundaries were redrawn after the 2010 Census. Because of the need to match county-congressional-district cells to CZs across periods of redistricting, as discussed in Section 3.3, outcomes for these later time periods may be measured with more noise.[40]

Figure 4 summarizes these estimates. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors that are clustered both at the level of CZs and congressional districts.[41] Consider first the impact of trade exposure for the middle tercile of centrist donors. In all periods except the first, 2002-2004, the impact is positive, but it is always small and imprecisely estimated. Congressional districts more exposed to import competition see no differential increase in campaign contributions from moderate donors at any time horizon. Consider next the impact of trade exposure on contributions by first-tercile liberal donors. These impacts are positive and precisely estimated in each time period.[42] They are small in the first two periods, roughly double in magnitude value in the middle three periods, 2002-2008, 2002-2010, and 2002-2012, and increase further in the final two periods. When examining the long-period change, 2002-2016, the coefficient estimate of 111.8 ($t = 2.59$) indicates that when comparing more-versus-less trade-exposed congressional districts, the more-exposed one would have 54.8% (111.8×0.49) higher campaign contributions by liberal first-tercile donors, equivalent to a 0.37 standard-deviation change in first-tercile contributions across districts over 2002 to 2016.

As with the 2002-2010 results, the impacts of trade exposure on campaign contributions by right-leaning donors are qualitatively similar to those for left-leaning donors when we expand the time horizon. Impacts of trade exposure on increased contributions by conservative donors are small and imprecise in the first two time periods. Coefficient estimates increase substantially in magnitude and become significant in the 2002-2008 period, and remain comparable in subsequent periods apart from a dip in 2014.[43] When examining the coefficient estimate for the full-period change, 2002-2016,

[40] As above, we discard the two-year change in districts in which redistricting occurs, as shown in equation (3). Results for 2002-2012 are accordingly very similar to those for 2002-2010 since a large majority of districts changed boundaries between 2010 and 2012.

[41] Full regression details appear in Appendix Table S8.

[42] The corresponding t-values for the change in import competition are 1.74 for 2002-2004, 1.85 for 2002-2006, 2.88 for 2002-2008, 2.29 for 2002-2010, 2.30 for 2002-2012, 2.66 for 2002-2014, and 2.59 for 2002-2016.

[43] The corresponding t-values for the change in import competition are 0.77 for 2002-2004, 0.48 for 2002-2006, 2.30 for 2002-2008, 1.70 for 2002-2010, 1.71 for 2002-2012, −0.20 for 2002-2014, and 1.39 for 2002-2016.

the now less-precise coefficient estimate of 52.6 ($t = 1.39$) indicates that when comparing more-versus-less trade-exposed districts, the more-exposed one would have 25.8% (52.6×0.49) higher campaign contributions by right-leaning donors, which is equivalent to a 0.17 standard-deviation change in third-tercile contributions across districts over 2002 to 2016. Overall, these results suggest that greater trade exposure induces a polarization in campaign contributions in the 2000s that is largely maintained through 2016. Contributions from liberal and conservative donors, but not from moderate donors, differentially expand in more-trade-exposed districts.

Figure 4: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variables: 100 x Proportional Change in Contributions by Type of Campaign Donor



Notes: Figure reports estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between changes in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and 100× proportional changes in campaign contributions within ideology terciles (based on 2002 contributions, as per Figure 2) across designated year pairs. Proportional changes are defined according to equation (6) and approximate a log change. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S8.

In Appendix Figure A1, we revisit the results in Figure 4 by estimating regressions in which we split counties according to whether or not a majority of their voting-age residents were non-Hispanic whites in the 2000 Census. We repeat the caveat that splitting on subcategories raises the risk of false positives. We believe this split is nevertheless justified by the clearly divergent ideological leanings and partisan news viewership habits of white non-Hispanics versus other groups (Section 2). The lion's share of U.S. county-district cells had a majority non-Hispanic white population in that year: 3,491 of 3,772 cells, corresponding to 370 of the 432 electoral districts (85.6%) that

are used in our analysis. This demographic split is, not surprisingly, correlated with the political affiliation of elected representatives.[44] For districts with a majority non-Hispanic white population in panel (a), the polarization results in Figure 4 are preserved. When considering districts with majority-minority populations in panel (b) of Appendix Figure A1, a materially distinct pattern emerges. There is a positive and significant impact of trade exposure on contributions by liberal donors, which is precisely estimated for all end years from 2006 forward. Conversely, impacts on contributions by moderate and conservative donors are small and imprecisely estimated in all years.

Together, our results on political expression suggest that localized economic shocks stemming from rising trade pressure in the 2000s increased the relative demand for conservative media content, support for conservative viewpoints, and campaign contributions by more ideologically extreme donors. Distinct from the media viewership data, we see clear polarization in political contributions in trade-exposed districts. Our evidence on the ideological composition of campaign donors supports the inference that a broad political realignment occurred in trade-exposed locations in the first decade of the 2000s, as trade pressure was rising, and that it persisted through 2016. In all outcomes we have considered, these rightward shifts are concentrated among non-Hispanic whites, with small, zero, or countervailing effects among Hispanics and non-whites. We do not, however, have a preferred explanation for why the political realignment we identify manifests in polarization in the case of campaign donations versus rightward shifts in the case of media consumption.

5 Impact of Trade Shocks on Congressional Election Outcomes

We now shift focus from political expression to electoral outcomes for the U.S. Congress. We first consider the impact of import exposure on the standard election measures of voter turnout and party vote shares in congressional elections, which allows us to square our results with current literature. We then examine how trade shocks have affected the composition of election winners, measured by party affiliation and ideological orientation.

5.1 Campaign Competitiveness, Party Vote Shares, and Party Win Percentages

We initially consider how rising exposure to import competition affects the number of registered voters who cast ballots and the share of votes cast captured by the GOP in congressional elections. In column 1 of Table 4, the dependent variable is the change in fraction of registered voters who turn out to vote in the general congressional election, where outcomes are for the 2002 to 2010 period.[45] In

[44] Our sample comprises 3,108 counties, of which 2,924 are majority-white. Minority-dominated counties are more populous on average, so that the reported fraction of minority-dominated districts is larger than the fraction of minority-dominated counties. Majority- and minority-dominated areas have an average trade shock value of 0.71. 58.5% of the population in majority white counties was represented by a Republican in 2002; conversely, 76.8% of the population in minority-dominated areas was represented by a Democrat in 2002

[45] We continue to use regression specification (5).

all regressions we include the full set of controls for initial economic conditions, political conditions, and demographic characteristics, matching the specification in column 5 of Table 3. Voter turnout is higher in congressional districts subject to larger increases in trade exposure in their corresponding CZs. The coefficient estimate of 5.27 ($t = 2.72$) implies that when comparing districts at the 75^{th} versus 25^{th} percentiles of trade exposure, the more exposed district would have a 2.6 percentage-point (5.27×0.49) larger increase in voter turnout, relative to mean turnout in 2002 of 46.7% and a mean 2002-2010 change in turnout of 3.3 percentage points.[46] These results accord with the findings of Table 3 suggesting that rising trade exposure increases the intensity of electoral campaigns, as seen in elevated campaign contributions and voter participation.

Table 4: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2010. Dependent Variables: Change in Turnout among Registered Voters, Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share, or Change in Republican Win Probability (in % pts).

	Turnout in % of Reg. Voters	*Two-Party Republican Vote Share by District Sample*				Prob Republican Elected
		All Districts	Solid Democrat	Compe-titive	Solid Republican	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ CZ Import Penetration	5.27	-1.08	-0.95	6.10	-6.24	24.08
	(1.94)	(5.98)	(1.80)	(4.93)	(3.93)	(12.07)

Notes: $N = 3,772$ county-district cells, except $N = 2,772$ in column 1. Turnout among registered voters is measured at the county level and excludes counties in districts with uncontested elections in 2002 or 2010, as well as district that were redistricted in 2004 or 2006. The Republican two-party vote share is the ratio of Republican votes to the sum of Democratic and Republican votes. Column 3 indicates the change in vote share in the 129 districts where the Democratic party maintained a two-party vote share of >55% in every election from 2002 to 2010. Its sets the outcome variable to zero for all districts where this condition was not met. Column 5 correspondingly indicates the change in vote share in the 124 districts where the Republican party maintained a two-party vote share of >55% in every election from 2002 to 2010, while column 4 comprises the 179 remaining districts. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.

To test whether the trade-induced increase in electoral competitiveness tends to favor one political party, we report in column 2 of Table 4 an estimate for the change in the GOP share of two-party vote in the general congressional election.[47] Trade exposure has a modest negative impact on the Republican vote share, where the coefficient estimate is small (−1.1 percentage points per percentage-point change in trade exposure) and imprecise. These results are broadly in line with Che et al.

[46] This finding is consistent with the classic quiescence hypothesis in political science (Edelman, 1971), which views low voter turnout as indicative of voter satisfaction, and conversely, implies that rising voter dissatisfaction will spur turnout. Charles and Stephens (2013) show that U.S. counties with lower growth of employment and wages experience greater electoral turnout.

[47] The Republican two-party vote share is the share of Republican votes among the total of Republican and Democratic votes. We count as a Democrat the lone independent member of Congress, Bernie Sanders of Vermont. On two occasions, Sanders later sought the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party.

(2016), who document vote share gains for Democrats in counties with greater exposure to Chinese import competition from 2002 to 2010.

Further analysis at the county-district level allows us to identify the districts that accounted for these vote share gains by the Democratic party. In columns 3 to 5, we split districts into "safe districts" that were consistently held by the same party with vote shares of 55% or higher in each election from 2002 to 2010, and "competitive" districts where neither party consistently attained at least 55% of the vote. This classification yields 129 "safe Democratic" districts, 124 "safe Republican" districts, and 179 "competitive" districts. Columns 3 to 5 respectively interact the vote share outcome of column 2 with dummies for safe Democratic, competitive, and safe Republican districts, such that the regression coefficients across these columns add up to the total effect in column 2. The column 3 and 5 results indicate that the Democratic party increased its vote share in trade-exposed districts that remained under safe control of the incumbent party. Column 4 shows that the Republican party gained in trade-exposed districts where both parties were competitive. While none of the columns 2 to 5 results is precisely estimated, the coefficient pattern suggests that modest overall vote share gains for the Democratic party masks gains for the Republican party in the electorally consequential subset of districts that were not firmly controlled by one party. Indeed, column 6 shows that districts more exposed to import competition became more likely to elect a GOP legislator, where this impact is significant at the 5% level ($t = 2.00$). Comparing more-versus-less trade-exposed congressional districts, the more exposed district would have a substantial 11.8 percentage-point (24.08×0.49) larger increase in the probability of electing a Republican.

Consistent with Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we find that the contribution of trade shocks to GOP electoral odds did not manifest during the 2002 to 2008 period. In Figure 5a, import competition has little effect on the party balance in Congress prior to 2010, as captured by its null impacts on the change in probability that a GOP legislator is elected over the 2002 to 2004, 2006, and 2008 time periods.[48] Electoral gains for the GOP emerge in the 2010 mid-term election, which brought many Tea Party Republicans into Congress, and persist thereafter. In Figure 5a, over the 2002-2012, 2002-2014, and 2002-2016 time periods, greater trade exposure had positive and precisely estimated impacts on the incremental probability that a GOP candidate won the election, where the coefficient magnitudes for these later-ending periods are similar to those for 2002-2010. Over these same time horizons, Figure 5b shows that the trade-exposure impact on the GOP vote share is

[48]See Appendix Table S9 for regression details. Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) report that through the Congress elected in 2008, trade-exposed districts had no greater likelihood of a contested primary, no greater likelihood of a loss by the incumbent candidate, and no lower vote share for the incumbent candidate. While they did not study the electoral success of the Democratic and Republican parties in those districts, they observe that elected legislators did not systematically adjust their voting behavior in Congress apart from greater support for protectionist bills.

small, negative, and highly imprecisely estimated, as is the case for 2002 to 2006, 2008, and 2010.[49]

How do we reconcile trade shocks weakly lowering the GOP vote shares in Figure 5b while raising GOP win probabilities in Figure 5a? Column 4 of Table 4 offers suggestive evidence that the Republican party may have improved its electoral results in the competitive districts where a few additional percentage points of the vote share can prove decisive for victory. In supplemental analysis, we indeed find that greater trade exposure has a positive impact on the likelihood that Republicans win an election with a relatively narrow GOP vote margin of up to 20%, while reducing the likelihood of a dominant GOP victory with a margin exceeding 20%. These outcomes accord with the results in Tables 3 and 4 on how trade shocks increase campaign intensity.

More competitive elections could be the consequence of parties running more centrist candidates against each other, who, because they compete for similar groups of voters, realize narrower electoral margins. Alternatively, Glaeser et al. (2005) suggest that greater competitiveness of elections could result from more extreme candidates who exploit wedge issues to catalyze voter turnout and financial contributions among their core supporters. In the models in Grossman and Helpman (2018) and Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019), inflaming wedge issues is the rough equivalent of strengthening group identity, such as Tea Party acolytes declaring their opposition to immigration, affirmative action, and social protections for disadvantaged groups. In either case, extreme candidates—by virtue of their extremism—may be more likely to win elections narrowly when they prevail.

Under the plausible supposition that wedge issues in the U.S. divide voters along racial and ethnic lines, this latter interpretation suggests that the impact of trade exposure on GOP vote gains should vary systematically with districts' racial and ethnic composition. We explore this possibility in Appendix Figure S5. The positive impact of trade exposure on GOP electoral odds from 2002-2010 onwards stems entirely from majority non-Hispanic-white counties, shown in Figure S5a. In trade-exposed majority-minority areas, Republicans achieved some gains until the 2002-2008 period, but faced small and imprecisely estimated losses in 2002-2010 or any subsequent period, shown in Figure 5b. This set of results suggests—though does not prove—that the net electoral gains of the GOP realized in trade-impacted districts, often with narrow margins of victory, are likely built on socially divisive rather than centrist campaign platforms.

In summary, greater trade exposure leads to sizable increases in the likelihood of GOP victory in majority white non-Hispanic congressional districts from 2002–2010 forward but not in majority-

[49]In Appendix Table S5, we explore the sensitivity of the results in Figures 5a and 5b to varying the set of controls included in the regression, while focusing on the time periods 2002 to 2010 and 2002 to 2016. In both periods, the impact of trade shocks on the change in GOP win probability increases in magnitude with the addition of industry and occupation controls and census division dummies, and becomes precisely estimated once the latter geographic variables are included. The addition of controls for initial demographic conditions and earlier presidential voting patterns has little further impact on the results. In both time periods and in all specifications, there is a highly imprecise relationship between trade shocks and the change in GOP vote shares.

minority districts. As with earlier results on news viewership and partisan political contributions, the rightward shifts we detect are concentrated among non-Hispanic whites.

Figure 5: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2004/16. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability and Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share or (in % pts)

a. Change in Probability Republican is Elected



b. Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share



Notes: Estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between the change in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and (panel A) the change in the probability that a Republican is elected, and (panel B) the change in the Republican two-party vote share, both measured in percentage points. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S9.

5.2 Ideology of Congressional Election Winners

Party affiliation is an incomplete measure of ideological orientation. For instance, when a Tea Party affiliated representative replaces a mainstream Republican, this event does not register on the GOP win/lose outcome variable considered above. To probe these deeper distinctions, we characterize the impact of rising trade exposure on congressional elections according to the political party *and* ideological orientation of those elected, where the ideology of winners is measured by the contribution-weighted-average CF score of the donors to their election campaign. We define "moderate Democrats" and "moderate Republicans" as legislators whose contribution-weighted-average CF score would place them in the more centrist half of their party's legislators in 2002. By contrast, "liberal Democrats" have an ideology score below the median of their party in 2002, while "conservative Republicans" have an ideology score above the 2002 party median.[50]

Figure 6 displays estimates of the impact of trade exposure on the probability that candidates from equal ideological partitions are elected to the House of Representatives for time periods ranging from 2002-2004 to 2002-2016. The specification is that in equation (5), with full controls for initial economic conditions, political conditions, and demographic characteristics. Each bar represents a separate regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the likelihood that a given type of candidate wins the election. Because the four categories—liberal Democrat, moderate Democrat, moderate Republican, conservative Republican—are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the heights of the four bars sum to zero within each time period, except for small deviations caused by the redistricting adjustments of section 3.3. Regression details appear in Appendix Table S10.

Consider first electoral outcomes for conservative Republicans. In all time horizons from 2002-2010 onward, districts subject to greater import competition became substantially more likely to elect a GOP conservative. This effect is significant at the 10% level in 2002-2010 ($t = 1.88$), 2002-2012 ($t = 1.88$), 2002-2014 (t-value $t = 1.95$), and 2002-2016 ($t = 1.72$) for which the coefficient magnitude falls in the narrow range of 29.9 to 26.8. Using results for the 2002 to 2016 period, when comparing a more-versus-less trade-exposed district, the former would have a 13.2 percentage-point (26.8×0.49) higher likelihood of electing a conservative Republican.

[50] DIME records campaign contributions for 96.2% of all election winners from 2002 to 2016. In the rare cases where a winner received no contributions during an electoral cycle, we impute the winner's ideology value using the next previous or subsequent election in which the same candidate obtained contributions, or absent that, from other same-party election winners of the same district or state. These imputations do not materially affect our results.

Figure 6: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position



Notes: Figure reports estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between the change in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and the probability that a candidate of an indicated party and political position is elected (in percentage points). The four categories—liberal Democrat, moderate Democrat, moderate Republican, conservative Republican—are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S10.

These improvements in electoral prospects for GOP conservatives in trade-exposed districts necessarily come at the expense of other candidate types. For 2002-2010 onward, the impacts of greater import competition on the election probabilities of each of the other three candidate types is negative, though none is precisely estimated. The pattern of results indicates that trade shocks do not cause a monotone shift towards the political right. Instead, moderate politicians experience the largest decline in election probability in each period. In 2002-2010 and later periods, the relative losses of moderates *within each party* coincide with the overall shift in favor of the Republican party shown in Figure 5a above. Both of these developments leave *moderate Democrats* as the group that accounts for the bulk of the losses from conservative GOP gains from 2010 onwards. For 2002-2010, the shock-induced decline in election probability for moderate Democrats is 52.3% (−15.6/29.9) of the gain for GOP conservatives, a fraction that reaches 85.9% (−23.1/26.8) for 2002-2016. Moderate Republicans suffer small declines in election probability in each period of the analysis, and thus underperform relative to conservatives in their party, while liberal Democrats' similarly small declines

outperform the much larger losses suffered by moderate Democrats. These results align with the noted demise of moderate congressional legislators in recent decades (e.g., Layman et al., 2006).[51]

To further scrutinize these non-monotone shifts in electoral success, we again split the sample based on whether or not the majority of voting-age residents in a county were white non-Hispanics in the year 2000. These estimates are summarized in Figure 7, while regression details appear in Appendix Table S11. Figure 7a shows that in counties with majority non-Hispanic White populations, trade exposure catalyzed movements towards GOP conservatives in 2002-2010 and all later periods. The impacts are marginally significant for 2002-2010, 2002-2012, and 2002-2014 (t-values $t = 1.8$, 1.82, and 1.93, respectively) and slightly less precise for 2002-2016 ($t = 1.61$). Focusing attention on the balance of counties where less than half of the voting-age population is non-Hispanic white (Figure 7b), we find a largely complementary pattern: liberal Democrats made strong gains in these locations in the probability of taking office for 2002-2010 and later periods. For the full sample period of 2002-2016, the standardized effect size is a 21.5 percentage-point ($t = 2.74$) increase in the probability that a liberal Democrat wins office. These gains came largely at the expense of moderate Democrats, whose standardized loss in win probability is 21.1 percentage points ($t = 3.25$).

These results support the reasoning above: in locations with a white non-Hispanic majority voter pool, GOP conservatives who gain at moderates' expense pull support across party lines and thereby increase the likelihood of a GOP win; in locations with a majority non-white and Hispanic electorate, liberal Democrats pull support from moderates of their own party, meaning that wins by liberal Democrats do not increase Democrat win rates overall. The net result is that although more ideologically extreme members of both parties gain office, it is the GOP that gains seats.

An emerging political economy literature, discussed in the Introduction, hypothesizes that economic shocks have the potential to amplify the political salience of racial and ethnic identity, yielding divergent responses to trade (or other) shocks among race and ethnic groups, even conditional on economic status (Grossman and Helpman, 2018; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2019). We read our evidence above as supporting the interpretation that trade shocks have intensified political partisanship: raising both voter turnout and individual-level campaign contributions, and spurring majority and minority-dominated areas to respond in ideologically opposing directions, seen both in campaign contributions and votes for non-centrist candidates.

[51] In Appendix Table S6, we explore the sensitivity of the results in Figure 6 to varying the set of controls included in the regression, while focusing on the time periods 2002 to 2010 and 2002 to 2016. Throughout all specification and periods, the import shock reduces the electoral success of moderate Democrats relative to all other groups, while conservative Republicans reap much of the offsetting electoral gains. The addition of industry and occupation controls and census division dummies increases the magnitude of these effects but lowers their precision, with some estimates attaining marginal statistical significance for both outcomes. The estimates for liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans are smaller in magnitude, unevenly signed, and highly insignificant.

Figure 7: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

a. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



b. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



Notes: Figure reports estimates of equation (5), with full controls for initial economic conditions, political conditions, and demographic characteristics. Each bar represents a separate regression in which the dependent variable is the change in the likelihood that a given type of candidate wins the election. The four categories—liberal Democrat, moderate Democrat, moderate Republican, conservative Republican—are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. By definition, half of each party's representatives in 2002 are considered moderates. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Panel A presents estimates for counties with majority non-Hispanic white populations in 2000, while panel B presents estimates for the complementary set. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Regression details appear in Appendix Table S11.

Before proceeding to results for presidential elections, we briefly consider the robustness of the measure of ideological affiliation used in the analysis, the Campaign Finance (CF) measure. While this measure is increasingly used in political science, it is newer and less commonly applied than the DW-Nominate score, which is based on roll call votes in Congress. In an earlier version of this paper examining a shorter time span (Autor et al., 2016b), we also employed DW-Nominate. Unfortunately, the DW-Nominate series which allows each legislator's ideology to evolve according to a linear trend has not been updated beyond 2012, and we were not able to consistently recreate and extend these data ourselves.[52] We accordingly deploy the CF score (Bonica, 2013), which is consistently constructed for the time period we study. As noted above, CF scores permit us to examine both the ideology of donors and the ideology of those elected to office.[53]

To probe the robustness of the results to the choice of ideology measure, we have classified the ideology of elected legislators using DW-Nominate scores for the time period of 2002-2010. In Appendix Table A2, we show similar impacts of import competition on the electoral success of moderate and non-moderate Democrats and Republicans over the 2002-2010 period, whether classified using CF or DW-Nominate scores.[54] An additional robustness check indicates that the trade shock had a sizable positive but imprecisely measured impact on the electoral success of legislators who are connected to the Tea Party movement.[55]

6 Impact of Trade Shocks on Presidential Elections

Because each congressional district chooses among a disparate set of candidates, votes cast for a candidate from the same political party in different districts are not necessarily votes cast in favor of a legislator with the same ideological position relative to local alternatives. Presidential elections

[52] Another version of Nominate scores forces legislator ideology to be constant over the full tenure of a legislator in Congress, which is arguably less appealing for studying changes in the ideological composition of Congress over time.

[53] Whereas contribution-weighted donor CF scores allow legislator ideology to evolve flexibly over time, the DW-Nominate scores we used impose a linear time trend on legislator ideology.

[54] In panel A of Appendix Table A2, we define moderate politicians as those whose average campaign donor CF score would place them into the more centrist half of their party's congressional delegation in 2002. In panel B, we implement the same split based on DW-Nominate scores. With either classification, we find that a CZ at the 75th percentile of import exposure has a substantially increased likelihood of electing a conservative Republican compared to a CZ at the 25th percentile of exposure—a 14.6 percentage-point (29.88×0.49) increase in panel A based on DIME and a 17.5 percentage-point (35.76×0.49) increase in panel B based on DW-Nominate. With either classification, a majority of the gains for conservative Republicans come at the expense of moderate Democrats, and within either party, moderates perform worse than non-moderates.

[55] We classified legislators as connected to the Tea Party movement if they had a known affiliation at any time with one of the following far-right caucuses of the House: Tea Party Caucus, Liberty Caucus, and Freedom Caucus, which respectively formed in the congressional periods that commenced in 2010, 2012 and 2014. While these caucuses do not publish official membership lists, Wikipedia compiles lists of individuals who self-identified or were identified by others as members. We pooled these lists from the Wikipedia entries of May 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017, which we accessed via the Wayback Machine Internet Archive. According to this definition, there were 77 Tea Party Republicans in the 2010 Congress, nearly three quarters of which were conservative Republicans according to the CF score measure. According to untabulated regression results for the 2002-2010 period, the standardized effect size of the import shock is a 9.0 percentage-point ($t = 1.50$) increase in the likelihood of electing a Tea Party Republican.

by contrast provide a setting in which all localities simultaneously choose among the same set of candidates. This fact motivates our examination of the effect of trade exposure on presidential vote outcomes. A side benefit of examining voting in presidential contests is that the time-varying geographic structure of congressional districts does not apply to presidential elections. Hence, we can analyze county-level changes of party vote shares in presidential elections for a longer time period without confronting the vagaries of re-districting.

In Table 5, we estimate the impact of trade exposure on the change in the county-level GOP vote share between the 2000 and 2008 and the 2000 and 2016 presidential elections. These highly competitive elections bracket the time period of our analysis of congressional elections. The three years considered—2000, 2008, and 2016—correspond to elections in which a two-term incumbent (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, respectively) was stepping down from office, and thus represent common positions in the political cycle.[56] Our measure of trade exposure is that used in equation (5), now defined over the period 2000 to 2008, while the instrumentation strategy continues to follow that in section 3.1.[57]

The 2SLS estimates reported in panel A of Table 5 find a positive and marginally statistically significant impact ($t = 1.87$) of rising Chinese import competition on the share of votes going to the GOP presidential candidate between 2000 and 2008. The point estimate for the column 6 regression, which includes full controls, implies that the Republican two-party vote share rose by nearly a full percentage point for an interquartile range increase in import penetration ($1.59 \times 0.58 = 0.91$). Panel B indicates that the trade-induced shift in party vote share persisted after 2008. Counties that had been more exposed to import competition during the Chinese import boom continued to favor the Republican candidate in the 2016 election, where the impact with full controls in column 6 is larger in magnitude (1.71) and slightly more precisely estimated ($t = 1.90$) than for the 2000-2008 period.[58]

[56] Because voting patterns in incumbency elections tend to be skewed towards the party of the sitting president, they are not closely comparable to elections where the president is ineligible (or not running) for reelection. Historically, the party holding the presidency has won two out of every three elections when the incumbent president was running, but only half of the elections when the incumbent was stepping down (Mayhew, 2008).

[57] The sequentially added control variables follow the specification used for congressional elections, except that we lag controls for electoral outcomes in presidential elections by an additional four years to avoid a mechanical correlation with the outcome variables.

[58] In a related research note (Autor et al., 2017), we also find a significant positive impact on the change in GOP presidential county vote shares over 2000 to 2016 for a CZ-level trade shock that extends from 2000 to 2014, the last year for which we have trade data (where most of the increase in Chinese import penetration occurred by 2008). We calculate that a 50.0% ceteris paribus reduction in the China trade shock between 2000-14 would have tipped the narrow Republican voter majority in the states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan, leading to an Electoral College victory for Hillary Clinton, instead of a victory for Donald Trump. This notional exercise highlights the relevance of a trade-induced shift in party vote shares in presidential elections, which are more closely contested than most congressional elections. It however corresponds to a restrictive scenario where local exposure to the China shock affects the 2016 U.S. presidential general election exclusively through its effect on the local Republican two-party vote share. Our results above show that the China shock altered the ideological composition of the House prior to 2016, and those representatives' political activities may have subsequently contributed to the 2016 election outcome.

These results on presidential elections appear to corroborate our finding from congressional elections that greater trade exposure induces a net shift in favor of candidates on the right.[59]

Table 5: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Presidential Election Vote Shares, 2000-2008 and 2000-2016, 2SLS Estimates. Dependent Variable: Change in Percentage of Two-Party Vote Obtained by Republican Candidate, 2008 (McCain) or 2016 (Trump) vs 2000 (Bush)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	A. ΔNet Republican Vote Share 2000-2008				
Δ CZ Import Penetration 2000-2008	1.54	5.60	2.38	1.75	1.59
	(0.73)	(1.41)	(1.24)	(0.86)	(0.85)
	B. ΔNet Republican Vote Share 2000-2016				
Δ CZ Import Penetration 2000-2008	3.86	3.98	1.72	1.99	1.71
	(1.48)	(1.69)	(1.71)	(0.97)	(0.90)
Estimation Method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage	63.7	50.2	46.4	48.1	48.0
2000 Ind/Occ Controls		yes	yes	yes	yes
Census Division Dummies			yes	yes	yes
2000 Demography Controls				yes	yes
1992/1996 Election Controls					yes

Notes: N=3,107 counties, excluding Alaska and Hawaii. The mean change in net Republican vote share is -3.50 (s.d. 5.69) between 2000 and 2008 and is -0.74 (s.d. 9.95) between 2000 and 2016. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS. Observations are weighted by counties' total votes in the 2000 presidential election, and standard errors are clustered by CZ. Industry and occupation controls in column 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations. Census division dummies in column 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic controls in column 5 comprise the percentage of a county's population in nine age and four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in column 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at the county level.

[59] In related work, Che et al. (2016) report that increases in county-level trade exposure stemming from the U.S. grant of Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR) to China in 2000 seems to disadvantage Republican presidential candidates, which is opposite in spirit to our results above. Despite similarities, we do not believe this finding directly bears on our results. Che et al. pool data on each presidential election between 1992 to 2008 and thus study an earlier time window than ours, while combining both elections with and without an incumbent president who was seeking reelection. Since their paper is focused on Congressional rather than presidential elections, it reports only a single regression estimate for the latter. Because this estimate derives from a very demanding regression specification that controls for multiple measures of import exposure and covariates interacted with a post-PNTR indicator, it is challenging to interpret and evaluate its relationship to our results without further elaboration.

7 Concluding Remarks

The polarization of national politics has been one of the defining developments of American discourse of the last several decades. The coincidence of intensifying political partisanship and rising income inequality has led many to conjecture that economic changes are at least partly responsible for greater political divisiveness. Indeed, political actors have frequently suggested a connection between changes in the U.S. economy and the growing ideological divide in Congress. In the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidates from both parties singled out China's rise as an international competitor as a principal cause of U.S. economic malaise. Yet, there is a paucity of previous evidence that substantiates a causal impact of specific economic shocks on political polarization.

Our contribution in this paper is to document that this vitriolic campaign rhetoric is indicative of underlying economic pressures that find voice in electoral contests. Across a broad range of outcomes, growing import competition from China has contributed either to a shift to the political right, or to a polarization where both liberal and conservative forces gain relative to moderates. These patterns manifest in a rightward shift of the media-viewing habits of U.S. adults, greater polarization in the ideological orientation of campaign contributors, and net gains in the number of conservative GOP representatives, which come largely at the cost of moderate Democrats. During the two most recent non-incumbent presidential elections, 2008 and 2016, trade shocks also appeared to modestly increase the vote share of the Republican candidate.

For all of the outcomes that we study, rightward shifts in ideological affiliation and voting patterns are concentrated among or driven by non-Hispanic whites, with small, zero, or countervailing effects evident among Hispanics and non-whites. But the consequences for electoral outcomes are nuanced.In districts dominated by whites, the political beneficiaries of these economic forces are Republicans, particularly from the far right, whereas minority-dominated districts experience shifts to the left end of the spectrum. In both majority-white and majority-minority locations, however, these polarizing ideological shifts come primarily at the electoral expense of moderate Democrats, meaning that the net gains in seats accrues primarily to the Republican Party. The paradox of converging popular beliefs about the source of economic challenges accompanied by diverging beliefs about appropriate political responses is consistent with theoretical models that connect economic adversity to in-group/out-group identification, as motivated in part by group-based resource competition or opportunistic use of political extremism by political entrepreneurs.

What may distinguish trade in terms of its impact on political outcomes is that its disruptive effects are so concentrated demographically and geographically. The loss of manufacturing jobs has represented a major contraction in high-wage earning opportunities, especially for less-educated males (Autor et al., 2019). Further, whereas exposure to technological change in the labor market

has affected both wealthy cities populated by white-collar professionals and factory towns populated by blue-collar workers, rising import penetration from low-wage countries disproportionately bears on local labor markets that historically specialized in labor-intensive manufacturing (Autor et al., 2013b). The combination of these features enhances the salience of the labor-market impacts of trade and therefore their political resonance (Margalit, 2011). While it would be unwarranted based on this evidence to conclude that the China trade shock is the original or fundamental cause of three decades of growing U.S. political polarization, our analysis of the China trade shock highlights a nuance masked by aggregate trends: the connection between economic and political polarization may arise not entirely from overarching secular changes in the U.S. economy that affect skill demands nationally, but also from shocks whose disruptive force falls heavily on an identifiable set of voters who in turn respond with concentrated vehemence at the polls.

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Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variables: Proportional Change in Contributions by Ideology Type (in log points)

a. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



b. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



Notes: Figure reports estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between changes in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and 100× proportional changes in campaign contributions within ideology terciles (based on 2002 contributions, as per Figure 2) across designated year pairs. Proportional changes are defined according to equation (6) and approximate a log change. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S12.

Table A1: Summary Statistics on Prevalence of Congressional Redistricting and Frequency of Party Change in Districts with and without Changes in District Boundaries, 2004 to 2016

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Prevalence of Redistricting						
Redistricted States	ME, PA, TX	GA, part of TX	none	none	42 States	none	FL, NC, VA
No. Districts w/o Changes	380	414	432	432	7	432	383
No. Districts w/ Changes	52	18	0	0	425	0	49
	B. Frequency of Party Change						
in Districts w/o Changes	2.9%	7.0%	7.4%	16.2%	0.0%	4.3%	1.4%
in Districts w/ Changes	19.4%	15.7%	n/a	n/a	15.2%	n/a	16.3%

Notes: Years at the top of columns indicate the start of a congressional period. Panel B indicates the population-weighted fraction of county-district cells that change party in an election, reported separately for districts without and with boundary changes. The three congressional districts of Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.

Table A2: Comparing Measures of Ideology (CF versus DW-Nominate Scores) in Estimating the Effect of Exposure to Chinese Import Competition on Change in Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2010. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	Liberal Democrat	Moderate Democrat	Moderate Republican	Conserv. Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	A. Based on Average Donor CF Score			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-8.43	-15.64	-5.83	29.88
	(8.79)	(13.92)	(12.17)	(15.89)
	B. Based on DW-Nominate Score			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	2.13	-23.61	-11.98	35.76
	(7.01)	(13.16)	(9.60)	(13.16)

Notes: $N = 3,772$ county-district cells. Moderate politicians are defined as legislators whose ideology score would place them among the more centrist half of their party's legislators in 2002. In panel A, legislator ideology is measured as the average DIME CF score among a politicians donors, while in panel B, ideology is measured based on the DW-Nominate index with linear time trend, which draws on roll-call votes in Congress. The latter data series is not available through 2016. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Online Appendix

"Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure"

David Autor, MIT Department of Economics and NBER
David Dorn, University of Zurich and CEPR
Gordon Hanson, Harvard Kennedy School and NBER
Kaveh Majlesi, Lund University, Monash University and CEPR

A. Supplemental Figures and Tables

Figure S1: Nielsen Rating for Cable TV News Networks, by Race of Household Head, 2004 to 2016

a. Households Headed by Non-Hispanic Whites



b. Households Headed by Hispanics, Non-Whites



Notes: Nielsen ratings indicate the fraction of all TV-owning households that are tuned to a particular program at a particular time. Figure plots average ratings for the 5pm to 11pm time-slot, Monday through Friday, during the month of November for years 2004 through 2016. Sample size for each November estimate ranges from 99,000 to 119,000 households. Panels A and B present estimates for Nielsen households split according to the race and ethnicity of the household head.

Figure S2: Polarization in Campaign Finance Scores by Type of Campaign Donor

a. Campaign Contributions by Individuals



b. Campaign Contributions by Corporations



c. Campaign Contributions by Non-Corporate Organizations



Notes: Calculations based on Data Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections database (DIME; Bonica, 2013). Donor ideology is divided into ideology terciles based on campaign contributions in 2002 ranked by dollar-weighted CF scores. Liberal, moderate and conservative donors have CF scores that respectively fall into the first, second and third tercile of the CF score distribution. The height of each bar in each reported year reflects the share of all contributions (in dollars) falling within each 2002 ideology tercile by donor types, which are individuals, corporations, and non-corporate organizations in panels A, B, and C respectively.

Figure S3: County-District Cells for the 12th Congressional District of North Carolina for the 111th Congress.



Notes: Figure depicts the geography of North Carolina Congressional District 12, which crosses three Commuting Zones as defined for the 111th Congress.

Figure S4: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, November 2004 to November 2008/2012/2016. Dependent Variables: Nielsen TV Rating or Nielsen Market Share (in % pts)



Notes: Figure reports estimates of equation (4) for the relationship between changes in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and 100× changes in the news TV market share of indicated news channels across designated periods. All ratings are measured in November of a presidential election year. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 6 of Table 2. Observations are weighted by Nielsen's estimate of the number of TV households in each cell, and standard errors are clustered on CZs. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S7.

Figure S5: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2010. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability (in % pts)

a. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



b. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000



Notes: Estimates of equation (5) for the relationship between the change in China import exposure between 2002 and 2010 and (panel A) the change in the probability that a Republican is elected, and (panel B) the change in the Republican two-party vote share, both measured in percentage points. Each bar represents a coefficient from a separate regression while whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. All regressions include the full vector of control variables from column 5 of Table 3. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts. Full regression results are reported in Appendix Table S13.

Table S1: Questions Comprising the Ten Item Pew Ideological Consistency Scale

	Conservative Position (1)	*Liberal Position* (2)
1	Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good	Government often does a better job than people give it credit for
2	Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient	Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest
3	Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return	Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently
4	The government can't afford to do much more to help the needy	The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt
5	Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition	Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days
6	Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care	Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents
7	Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit	Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace
8	Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy	Business corporations make too much profit
9	The best way to ensure peace is through military strength	Stricter environmental laws and reulations are worth the cost
10	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society	Homosexuality should be accepted by society

Notes: Pew Ideological Consistency Scale, administered 1994 though present. Individual questions were recoded as "-1" for a liberal response, "+1" for a conservative response, "0" for other (don't know/refused/volunteered) responses. Scores on the full scale range from -10 (liberal responses to all 10 questions) to +10 (conservative responses to all 10 questions). Documentation available at http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/appendix-a-the-ideological-consistency-scale/ (accessed 11/23/2017)

Table S2: Summary Statistics for Changes in Commuting Zone-Level Exposure to Chinese Imports between 2002 – 2010 and 2000 – 2008

	2002-2010 (1)	2000-2008 (2)
Mean	0.71	0.90
25th Percentile	0.40	0.53
75th Percentile	0.90	1.11
P75 - P25	0.49	0.58

Notes: The change in exposure to Chinese imports is calculated as per equation (1). For each CZ, it is equal to the sum of the change in Chinese import absorption in each U.S. industry in the relevant time interval multiplied by that industry's start-of-period (lagged by ten-years) share of CZ employment. The 2002-2010 import shock in column 1 is used for the main analysis, and weights commuting zones by their adult voting-age population in 2000. The 2000-2008 import shock in column 2 is used for the analysis of presidential elections since 2000, and weights commuting zones by their number of votes in the 2000 presidential election.

Table S3: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and FOX Cable TV News Ratings, November 2004 to November 2008/2012/2016. Dependent Variable: Nielsen Market Share for FOX News by Age-Race Groups (in % pts)

	2004-2008	2004-2012	2004-2016
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Market Share Fox News		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	13.16	12.45	12.35
[t>2007] x N-H White 18-34	(5.88)	(6.90)	(5.79)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	7.33	12.93	13.49
[t>2007] x N-H White 35-54	(5.25)	(6.34)	(4.98)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	10.77	11.41	12.57
[t>2007] x N-H White 55+	(4.67)	(5.42)	(4.47)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	10.93	15.32	4.37
[t>2007] x Other Group 18-34	(6.49)	(8.70)	(6.54)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	6.60	7.76	7.32
[t>2007] x Other Group 35-54	(5.19)	(6.38)	(4.44)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	1.78	-0.75	3.27
[t>2007] x Other Group 55+	(4.76)	(5.66)	(5.66)

Notes: $N = 5,110$, $5,079$, $5,037$ in columns 1, 2, and 3. In November 2004, the combined Nielsen rating of FOX News, CNN and MSNBC was 0.9/2.0/4.9 for young/middle-aged/older non-Hispanic whites, and 0.5/0.9/2.1 for young/middle-aged/older Hispanics and non-whites. The market share of FOX News was 63/66/61 and 49/44/37 percent in the six groups. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 6 of Table 2.

Table S4: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, 2004 to 2012 (February/May/June/November). Dependent Variables: Change in Cable TV Rating or Cable TV News Market Share (in % pts).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. Combined Nielsen Rating of TV News Networks					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-0.13	-0.09	0.20	0.14	0.04	-0.06
[t=2012]	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)
	B. Market Share FOX News					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	3.05	4.18	4.69	6.45	7.80	10.06
[t=2012]	(1.31)	(2.46)	(4.05)	(3.89)	(4.42)	(4.35)
	C. Market Share CNN					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-1.51	-0.40	0.31	0.73	0.17	-0.09
[t=2012]	(0.94)	(1.78)	(3.85)	(3.94)	(4.49)	(4.42)
	D. Market Share MSNBC					
Δ CZ Import Penetration x	-1.54	-3.78	-5.00	-7.19	-7.96	-9.97
[t=2012]	(1.00)	(1.52)	(2.85)	(2.82)	(2.78)	(3.06)
Estimation Method	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage		49.3	44.0	41.3	30.4	30.5
CZ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Age-Race Group FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
CZ Industry/Occ x [t=2012]			yes	yes	yes	yes
Pres. Election Ctrls x [t=2012]				yes	yes	yes
Census Divisions x [t=2012]					yes	yes
Age-Race Group FE x [t=2012]						yes

N=27,921 CZ-year-age-race cells in Panel A and N=19,223 cells in Panels B-D. The Combined Nielsen Rating in Panel A indicates the percentage of households that own TVs that were watching one of the three major TV news networks. Panels B-D indicate the market share of each major TV news network in their combined market. Data in each year cover the four months during which Nielsen conducts ratings sweeps (February, May, July, November). In 2004, the average combined rating was 2.4%, and the TV news market shares were 53.3% for FOX News, 31.9% for CNN, and 14.8% for MSNBC. Control variables are defined as in Table 2. Observations are weighted by Nielsen's estimate of the number of TV households in each cell, and standard errors are clustered on CZs.

Table S5: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2010 and 2002-2016. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability and Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share (in % pts)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	A. Change in Republican Win Probability 2002-2010				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	5.48	14.53	23.89	24.59	24.08
	(5.30)	(11.56)	(11.63)	(11.88)	(12.07)
	B. Change in Republican Win Probability 2002-2016				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	6.47	18.78	27.75	28.06	27.07
	(5.43)	(11.72)	(12.02)	(12.10)	(12.37)
	C. Change in Republican Vote Share 2002-2010				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-0.40	1.34	-0.83	-0.54	-1.08
	(2.30)	(5.52)	(5.83)	(5.82)	(5.98)
	D. Change in Republican Vote Share 2002-2016				
Δ CZ Import Penetration	0.94	-4.58	-7.84	-5.60	-6.39
	(2.68)	(6.09)	(6.93)	(6.17)	(6.31)
Estimation Method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage	35.8	37.0	27.3	29.1	29.2
2000 Industry/Occ Controls		yes	yes	yes	yes
Census Division Dummies			yes	yes	yes
2000 Demographic Controls				yes	yes
1996/2000 Pres. Election Ctrls					yes

Notes: N=3,772 county-district cells. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in Table 3: Industry and occupation controls in column 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations. Census division dummies in column 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic controls in column 4 comprise the percentage of a county's population in nine age and four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in column 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at the county level. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.

Table S6: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2010 and 2002-2016. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	A. 2002 - 2010				B. 2002 - 2016			
	Liberal Dems	Moderate Dems	Moderate Repubs	Conserv Repubs	Liberal Dems	Moderate Dems	Moderate Repubs	Conserv Repubs
(1) Base Specification	0.05	-5.54	2.95	2.53	4.82	-10.62	0.66	5.27
	(3.75)	(5.83)	(5.73)	(6.55)	(5.81)	(6.86)	(6.20)	(6.95)
(2) + 2000 Ind/Occ Controls	-0.49	-14.05	-2.55	17.03	7.86	-24.89	2.37	15.32
	(8.18)	(14.44)	(11.87)	(14.58)	(10.76)	(16.28)	(13.30)	(15.24)
(3) + Census Division Dummies	-5.44	-18.46	-4.12	28.02	4.19	-30.85	0.29	25.71
	(8.72)	(13.93)	(11.94)	(15.55)	(11.45)	(16.59)	(12.42)	(15.42)
(4) + 2000 Demo Controls	-8.68	-15.90	-4.90	29.47	-2.87	-23.74	-0.17	26.63
	(8.82)	(13.77)	(11.98)	(15.85)	(10.35)	(15.68)	(12.19)	(15.55)
(5) + 1992/1996 Election Controls	-8.43	-15.64	-5.83	29.88	-2.52	-23.05	-1.38	26.84
	(8.79)	(13.92)	(12.17)	(15.89)	(10.27)	(15.91)	(12.35)	(15.61)

Notes: N=3772 county-district cells. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in Table 3: Industry and occupation controls in row 2 are measured at the CZ level and comprise the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations. Census division dummies in row 3 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demographic controls in row 4 comprise the percentage of a county's population in nine age and four racial groups, as well as the population shares that are female, college-educated, foreign-born, and Hispanic. Election controls in row 5 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, measured at the county level. Observations are weighted by a county-district cell's share in the total year-2000 voting age population of a district, so that each district has a total weight of one. Standard errors are two-way clustered on CZs and congressional districts.

B. Trade Exposure and Outcomes by Period

Tables below provide the period-specific coefficient estimates that are plotted in Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, and Appendix Figures S4, A1, S5.

Table S7: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Cable TV News Viewership, November 2004 to November 2008/2012/2016. Dependent Variables: Nielsen TV Rating or Nielsen Market Share (in % pts)

	2004-2008	2004-2012	2004-2016
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	A. Combined Ratings of TV News Networks		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2007]	-0.01	0.03	0.42
	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.79)
	B. Market Share FOX News		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2007]	8.83	10.48	10.53
	(4.28)	(5.30)	(3.91)
	C. Market Share CNN		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2007]	-2.55	-4.20	-3.89
	(4.57)	(3.36)	(3.54)
	D. Market Share MSNBC		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2007]	-6.28	-6.28	-6.65
	(4.30)	(3.72)	(2.76)

$N = 6,813,\ 6,923,\ 6,890$ CZ-year-age-race cells in columns 1 through 3 respectively. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 6 of Table 2.

Table S8: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variable: Change in Contributions by Type of Campaign Donor (in log points)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	41.45	43.61	73.31	71.00	72.40	108.89	111.76
	(23.83)	(23.56)	(25.43)	(31.06)	(31.49)	(41.00)	(43.08)
	B. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-3.08	3.05	18.56	23.60	23.97	13.79	13.13
	(11.79)	(13.97)	(15.24)	(19.63)	(19.58)	(33.97)	(36.72)
	C. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	17.88	12.18	57.65	46.05	47.12	-6.18	52.59
	(23.31)	(25.19)	(25.08)	(27.15)	(27.59)	(30.65)	(37.86)

Notes: $N = 3,772$ county-district cells. Panels A through C indicate the over-time change in contributions from donors whose CF score falls into the first, second, and third tercile of the dollar-weighted distribution of donor ideology in 2002. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S9: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2004/2016. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability and Change in Republican Two-Party Vote Share (in % pts)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Change in Republican Win Probability						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-0.27	-3.96	-2.54	24.08	24.08	26.05	27.07
	(5.07)	(7.12)	(8.13)	(12.07)	(12.07)	(12.19)	(12.37)
	B. Change in Republican Vote Share						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.85	-1.41	-5.35	-1.08	-1.05	-2.94	-6.39
	(4.22)	(5.45)	(6.23)	(5.98)	(5.98)	(7.27)	(6.31)

Notes: $N = 3772$ county-district cells. The dependent variable is the over-time change in probability of a Republican candidate winning the election (panel A) and the change in the Republican share of the two-party vote (panel B), both measured in percentage points. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S10: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2004/16. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				A. Liberal Democrats			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	3.72	-0.53	5.75	-8.43	-7.91	-1.12	-2.52
	(5.96)	(7.94)	(9.66)	(8.79)	(8.78)	(10.68)	(10.27)
				B. Moderate Democrats			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-3.45	4.49	-3.21	-15.64	-16.16	-25.34	-23.05
	(7.74)	(8.60)	(10.17)	(13.92)	(13.95)	(16.04)	(15.91)
				C. Moderate Republicans			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-4.55	-6.70	-10.55	-5.83	-5.83	-6.22	-1.38
	(6.99)	(9.01)	(10.79)	(12.17)	(12.17)	(13.01)	(12.35)
				D. Conservative Republicans			
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.29	2.74	8.01	29.88	29.88	28.82	26.84
	(8.26)	(9.38)	(12.42)	(15.89)	(15.89)	(14.96)	(15.61)

Notes: $N = 3,772$ county-district cells. Panels indicate the over-time change in ideology of election winners by party and ideology for liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S11: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Ideological Position of Election Winner, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variables: 100 x Change in Indicators for Election of Politician by Party and Political Position

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	I. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Liberal Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.82	2.07	11.98	-11.34	-10.45	-8.91	-10.17
	(6.83)	(8.96)	(10.51)	(9.51)	(9.45)	(10.87)	(10.22)
	B. Moderate Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-4.62	3.21	-9.24	-17.44	-18.33	-22.28	-19.11
	(8.72)	(9.59)	(11.74)	(16.50)	(16.55)	(18.49)	(18.08)
	C. Moderate Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-4.90	-5.78	-11.48	-6.09	-6.09	-7.48	-0.78
	(7.89)	(10.15)	(12.34)	(14.48)	(14.48)	(15.27)	(14.68)
	D. Conservative Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	4.70	0.49	8.74	34.91	34.91	34.28	30.15
	(9.33)	(10.78)	(14.61)	(19.14)	(19.14)	(17.74)	(18.75)
	II. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Liberal Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	11.40	-4.86	-29.27	30.12	30.12	59.90	43.89
	(15.90)	(15.80)	(18.64)	(17.71)	(17.71)	(19.47)	(16.00)
	B. Moderate Democrats						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-13.67	-2.24	-4.91	-29.67	-29.67	-59.00	-42.98
	(16.72)	(15.34)	(17.06)	(14.51)	(14.51)	(14.54)	(13.24)
	C. Moderate Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-5.59	4.33	4.12	8.19	8.19	0.40	-1.28
	(5.02)	(3.91)	(4.10)	(8.77)	(8.77)	(6.96)	(7.25)
	D. Conservative Republicans						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	7.86	2.77	30.06	-8.64	-8.64	-6.09	-4.41
	(5.17)	(6.73)	(18.05)	(8.50)	(8.50)	(10.24)	(9.64)

Notes: $N = 3,491$, $N = 276$ county-district cells in Panels I, II. Panels indicate the over-time change in ideology of election winners by party and ideology for liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans, for counties that were majority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel I) and those that were minority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel II). All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S12: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Campaign Contributions, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variable: Change in Contributions by Type of Campaign Donor (in log points)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	I. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	47.51	49.75	77.41	69.63	71.53	91.48	102.59
	(27.24)	(26.18)	(26.52)	(32.96)	(33.56)	(43.54)	(46.63)
	B. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-2.30	-0.22	20.99	22.38	23.26	-0.45	11.77
	(13.46)	(16.09)	(16.81)	(22.57)	(22.52)	(37.88)	(41.33)
	C. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	34.16	25.38	70.40	52.98	55.59	-14.54	55.88
	(25.41)	(27.88)	(27.73)	(30.63)	(31.06)	(33.90)	(42.59)
	II. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
	A. Left-Wing Contributions (1st Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-15.27	75.40	99.38	116.79	117.93	165.99	151.70
	(21.99)	(33.65)	(39.28)	(50.56)	(50.56)	(53.19)	(57.81)
	B. Moderate Contributions (2nd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-10.51	79.10	63.37	54.40	53.84	73.75	21.53
	(19.02)	(26.16)	(31.13)	(23.59)	(23.31)	(36.59)	(42.27)
	C. Right-Wing Contributions (3rd Tercile of Donor CF Score)						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-75.25	12.22	74.09	31.80	30.54	47.01	33.96
	(44.96)	(49.17)	(58.38)	(44.97)	(44.77)	(53.43)	(67.47)

Notes: $N = 3,491$, $N = 276$ county-district cells in Panels I, II. Panels indicate the over-time change in ideology of election winners by party and ideology for liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, moderate Republicans, and conservative Republicans, for counties that were majority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel I) and those that were minority non-Hispanic white in 2000 (panel II). All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

Table S13: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Electoral Results, 2002-2004/2016. Heterogeneity by Initial Local Racial Composition. Dependent Variables: Change in Republican Win Probability (in % pts)

	2002-04	2002-06	2002-08	2002-10	2002-12	2002-14	2002-16
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	A. Counties with Majority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	-0.20	-5.29	-2.73	28.78	28.78	30.98	31.23
	(5.95)	(8.14)	(9.21)	(14.65)	(14.65)	(14.90)	(15.09)
	B. Counties with Minority Non-Hispanic White Population in 2000						
Δ CZ Import Penetration	2.27	7.10	34.18	-0.45	-0.45	-5.69	-5.69
	(3.45)	(4.37)	(17.32)	(9.17)	(9.17)	(10.97)	(10.97)

Notes: $N = 3,491$, $N = 276$ county-district cells in Panels A, B. Panels indicate the over-time change in probability of a Republican candidate winning the election. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS and use the full vector of controls, weights, and standard errors as defined in column 5 of Table 3.

C. Trade Exposure and Changes in Political Beliefs

Using the Pew data presented in Section 7, we explore how rising trade exposure affects expressed political beliefs. We include surveys in 2004, 2011, 2014, and 2015, where we treat the latter three years as a single time period to maximize sample size. Our local labor market approach puts high demands on the data as we observe only 25 observations on average per CZ.[60] Having this caveat in mind, we proceed with an analysis that follows the structure of (4) by estimating an equation of the form:

$$Y_{ijt} = \gamma_j + \gamma_1 \Delta IP_{j\tau}^{cu} \times 1[t = t_2] + Z_{ijt}^{'}(\gamma_3 + \gamma_4 \times 1[t = t_2]) + X_{jt_1}^{'}\gamma_6 \times 1[t = t_2] + \epsilon_{ijt}, \qquad (7)$$

where the dependent variable Y_{ijt} is the Pew ideology score (on a scale of -10 to $+10$, from more liberal to more conservative) for survey participant i who resided in CZ j and who was interviewed in survey year t, with $t_1 = 2004$ and $t_2 = \{2011,\ 2014,\ 2015\}$; γ_j is a fixed effect for CZ j; and $1[t = t_2]$ is a dummy variable for the second time period. The main variable of interest is the change in import exposure $\Delta IP_{j\tau}$ in CZ j over 2002 to 2010, for which we instrument using (2). The control variables include Z_{ijt}, a vector of characteristics corresponding to participant ijt (a quadratic in age and dummy variables for gender, race, and three categories of education); and X_{jt_1}, the set of regional dummies and initial conditions used in equation (4). As in (4), we include CZ main effects and time-varying coefficients in equation (7) to examine whether average political beliefs change systematically over time within CZs as a function of CZ trade exposure.

Results for the Pew sample data appear in Table S14. In Column 1 of Table S14, which presents a parsimonious 2SLS regression, the coefficient on the interaction between the CZ trade shock

[60] The pooled sample of 20,914 participants includes 667 commuting zones that appear in at least one of the years and 419 commuting zones that appear both in both time periods (i.e., 2004 and at least one of 2011, 2014 or 2015).

and the second-period dummy is positive but small and not precisely estimated ($t = 1.41$). The coefficient magnitude increases substantially in value and becomes more precisely estimated when adding controls for initial economic conditions in column 2 ($t = 1.85$) and political conditions in column 3 ($t = 2.30$). The addition of full controls in column 5—for the Census region and interactions between individual demographic characteristics and the second-period dummy—reduces the trade-shock coefficient somewhat and leaves it marginally significant ($t = 1.69$).

These results suggest that demographically comparable survey respondents residing in commuting zones that were subject to larger increases in Chinese import competition in the 2000s became more likely to express conservative political beliefs over the course of a decade. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate in column 5 indicates that if we compare CZs at the 75^{th} and 25^{th} percentiles of trade exposure, the Pew ideology score would be predicted to increase by 0.65 points (1.30×0.49) between 2004 and 2011/14/2015, or one more right-leaning answer for every three survey respondents, in a CZ at the 75^{th} versus the 25^{th} percentile of trade exposure.[61]

Table S1 further suggests that the rightward shift in political beliefs over the 2000s was stronger among non-Hispanic whites than among other racial and ethnic groups. In the final columns of Table S14, we show results in which we estimate separate trade-shock coefficients for non-Hispanic-white participants versus Hispanic or non-white participants. Whereas the interaction between trade exposure and the second-period dummy is positive and precisely estimated for whites ($t = 2.41$ for partial controls in column 6; $t = 1.93$ for full controls in column 7), for racial and ethnic minorities it ranges from negative to positive and is imprecisely estimated in each case.

These estimates suggest that trade shocks may have engendered rightward shifts among voters, with stronger rightward shifts among whites than among non-whites. Because these models are estimated on a relatively small number of Pew survey observations covering a large number of CZs observed over two time periods, however, they offer insufficient precision to warrant stronger conclusions.

[61] With the interquartile range of import exposure equal to 0.49, an increase in the ideology score of 0.65 corresponds to one in every three respondents changing an answer from the left-leaning to the right-leaning position.

Table S14: Exposure to Chinese Import Competition and Pew Ideology Scores, 2004 – 2011/14/15. Dependent Variable: Change in Pew Ideology Score

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2010]	0.41	1.31	1.65	1.35	1.32		
	(0.27)	(0.68)	(0.71)	(0.78)	(0.77)		
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2010]						0.58	1.35
x Non-Hispanic White						(0.24)	(0.70)
Δ CZ Import Penetration x [t>2010]						-0.36	0.91
x Hispanic or Black						(0.33)	(0.75)
Wald Test Equal Coefficients						p<0.01	p<0.14
Estimation Method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
F-statistic First Stage	40.8	35.2	34.8	26.4	26.8	39.0	28.9
CZ FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographic Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
CZ Industry/Occ x [t>2010]		yes	yes	yes	yes		yes
Pres. Election Ctrls x [t>2010]			yes	yes	yes		yes
Census Divisions x [t>2010]				yes	yes		yes
Demographic Controls x [t>2010]					yes		yes

Notes: $N = 20,914$ in columns 1-5, $N = 19,556$ in columns 6-7. The Pew Ideology Score has a minimum of -10 (most liberal) and maximum of +10 (most conservative). Controls for individual demographics include a quadratic in age and indicators for sex, three race/ethnicity groups (non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics, all others), and three education groups (college, some college, high school and less). Industry and occupation controls in column 2 include the fraction of CZ employment in the manufacturing sector and the Autor and Dorn (2013) routine share and offshorability index of a CZ's occupations, all of which are measured in 2000 and interacted with the dummy for the 2011/14/15 period. Election controls in column 3 comprise the Republican two-party vote share in the presidential elections of 1996 and 2000, measured at the county level and interacted with the period dummy. Census division dummies interacted with the period dummy in column 4 allow for different time trends across the nine geographical Census divisions. Demography interactions in column 5 interact the demographic control variables with the dummy for the 2011/14/15 period. Models in columns 6 and 7 retain only individuals who are white, Hispanic or black. Observations are weighted by each individual's share in the sum of Pew survey weights of a given year, and standard errors are clustered on CZs.